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The Decision of I.G. Farbenindustrie to Locate a Plant in Auschwitz 
The Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, which was erected by the SS in October 
1942, was the first German concentration camp that was located on the plant 
grounds of a major private corporation.1 Its most important function was the fur-
nishing of concentration camp prisoners as slave laborers for building the 
I.G. Auschwitz plant, I.G. Farben‘s largest construction site. Instead of estab-
lishing an industrial production location on the grounds of an existing concentra-
tion camp, a company-owned branch camp of a concentration camp was put up 
here, for the first time, on a site belonging to an arms manufacturer. This new 
procedure for construction of the I.G. Auschwitz plant served as a model and in-
fluenced the subsequent collaboration between the arms industry and the SS in 
the process of expanding the concentration camp system in Nazi territory 
throughout Europe, particularly toward the end of the war, when numerous sub-
camps were established in the course of shifting industrial war production to un-
derground sites.2 
The Buna/Monowitz concentration camp was located in East Upper Silesia within 
the western provinces of Poland, which had been annexed by the German Reich. 
By Hitler‘s decree, these provinces had been incorporated into the German Reich 
as ―annexed eastern territories‖ (eingegliederte Ostgebiete) in late October 1939, 
after the Wehrmacht‘s military conquest of Poland.3 The Buna/Monowitz camp 
was erected about 7 kilometers east of the Auschwitz main camp (Stammlager), 
which was built in May 1940. It stood on a site of several square kilometers be-
                                       
1  In April 1942, 500 prisoners were transferred from the Buchenwald concentration camp to the 
first concentration camp established at the partially state-owned Volkswagen plant in 
Wolfsburg. These inmates were to be employed in a light metal foundry at the concentration 
camp, which was called Arbeitsdorf. In fall 1942, after Albert Speer, the Reich Minister of Ar-
maments and Munitions, deemed the startup of the foundry no longer strategic, the planned 
production of armaments was never taken up, and VW‘s Arbeitsdorf concentration camp was 
closed in October 1942. See Hans Mommsen / Manfred Grieger: Das Volkswagenwerk und 
seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1996), pp. 496–515; Susanne Willems: 
―Monowitz.‖ In: Wolfgang Benz / Barbara Distel, eds.: Der Ort des Terrors. Geschichte der 
nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Bd. 5. Hinzert, Auschwitz, Neuengamme (Munich: 
Beck, 2007), pp. 276–284, here pp. 276–277. 
2  Falk Pingel: Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im 
Konzentrationslager (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1978), p. 125f.; Bernd C. Wagner: IG 
Auschwitz. Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung von Häftlingen des Lagers Monowitz 1941–1945 
(Munich: Saur, 2000), pp. 212ff.; Dietrich Eichholtz: Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirt-
schaft 1939–1945. Bd. II (1941–1943) ( Berlin, GDR: Akademie, 1985), p. 225.  
3  ―Erlass der Führers und Reichskanzlers über Gliederung und Verwaltung der Ostgebiete,‖ 
October 8, 1939. In: Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1939, p. 2042f. 
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longing to I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, on land that bordered on the town of Ausch-
witz and the Weichsel and Soła rivers. There, in April 1941, the building of a 
major chemical plant for annual synthetic production of 75,000 tons of gasoline 
from coal and fuel oil, 30,000 tons of synthesized rubber (Buna), and plastics4 
had begun. There is scholarly debate regarding the date on which the property in 
Auschwitz-Monowitz became known to the top management of I.G. Farben as a 
potential site for a large industrial plant. A document of the Department of Eco-
nomic Efficiency Control of Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, dated December 
4, 1939, indicates that at least some top managers were aware of the building 
site in Auschwitz-Monowitz as early as December 1939.5 In December 1939, two 
task forces within I.G. Farben were working independently of one another on the 
site location search for Farben‘s new building and participation projects in Silesia 
and Upper Silesia. Board member Otto Ambros headed a group from Farben‘s 
Ludwigshafen plant that was planning the ―Buna III‖ project in Rattwitz, near 
Breslau. The construction of the third Buna plant was put on hold in July 1940 
because, in the estimation of the war economy experts at the Reichsamt für 
Wirtschaftsausbau, the Wehrmacht‘s needs for rubber could be supplied by nat-
ural rubber produced in the Dutch East Indies and in French colonies, as a result 
of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands.6 Under the direction of Farben board 
member Heinrich Bütefisch, managers at Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH 
                                       
4  Buna  derives its name from the German names of the chemicals butadiene and sodium: 
Butadien and Natrium. 
5  Cf. Florian Schmaltz / Karl Heinz Roth: ―Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte des I.G. Farben 
Werks Auschwitz-Monowitz. Zugleich eine Stellungnahme zur Kontroverse zwischen Hans 
Deichmann und Peter Hayes.‖ In: 1999. Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahr-
hunderts 13 (1998), no. 2, pp. 100–116. Objections to this attempt to reinterpret the multi-
stage process of location selection were raised by Piotr Setkiewicz, Peter Hayes, and Raymond 
Stokes: Piotr Setkiewicz: ―Eine wenig wahrscheinliche Hypothese.‖ In: Pro Memoria. Informa-
tion Bulletin 11 (1999), pp. 125–128, as well as the preface to the new edition of Peter Hayes: 
Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era. New Edition (Cambridge/New York: Cam-
bridge UP, 2001), p. xiv, fn. 18. Although no detailed consideration of the points of criticism 
can be given here, it must be said for the record that Peter Hayes cannot possibly have 
viewed the document dated December 4, 1939, from the Department of Economic Efficiency 
Control of Ammoniakwerke Merseburg, as he claims, in the 1980s in the Bundesarchiv Kob-
lenz, in the collection of the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau. At that time, the source in 
question was in the company archives of the Leunawerke in the GDR, and these holdings were 
transferred to the Staatsarchiv Merseburg in the 1990s. See also the critical discussion of the 
hypotheses in: Raymond G. Stokes: ―Von der I.G. Farbenindustrie AG bis zur Neugründung 
der BASF (1925–1952).‖ In: Werner Abelshauser, ed.: Die BASF. Eine Unternehmensge-
schichte (Munich: Beck, 2002), pp. 221–358, here pp. 302–305. 
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were engaged in planning a new fuel synthesis plant in Auschwitz and a coal 
mine 18 kilometers west of Auschwitz. It took an entire year for the two teams to 
work out the practical and organizational aspects of merging their plans with the 
I.G. Auschwitz/Fürstengrube project arranged by Merseburg and to create a 
cross-divisional construction project.7 In mid-December 1939, I.G. Farben‘s 
Technical Committee decided to acquire a corporate ―coal source for the I.G. in 
Upper Silesia.‖8 An ad hoc commission of in-house mining experts was tasked 
with examining the Upper Silesian coal deposits under consideration for acquisi-
tion, with regard to their quantity and quality and the economic profitability of 
their exploitation.9 An encouraging expert assessment of the anticipated coal 
deposits in the three seams of the Fürstengrube was presented in July 1940.10 
According to Günther Falkenhahn, the former general manager of Fürstlich 
Plessisches Bergwerk AG, in July 1940 I.G. Farbenindustrie (IGF) launched ―an 
initiative to found the Interessengemeinschaft IGF-Pless for the purpose of ex-
ploiting coalfields as an energy source for the planned IGF-Auschwitz Buna 
                                       
6  Peter John Turnbull Morris: ―The Development of Acetylene Chemistry and Synthetic Rubber 
by I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft: 1926–1945‖ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ox-
ford, 1982), pp. 321–326; Hayes: Industry and Ideology, pp. 347–348. 
7  Exactly how and when this cross-divisional cooperation on the I.G. Auschwitz construction 
project came about cannot be reconstructed in detail to date on the basis of the available 
sources. A major mediating role, however, seems to have been played by Carl Krauch, the 
General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production. The negotiations of 
Ambros and Bütefisch regarding possible cooperation with Schlesien-Benzin in Auschwitz, 
however, were mutually settled in January 1941 at the latest, cf. Schlesien-Benzin Wk/S., Be-
sprechung am 16.1.1941 in Ludwigshafen über Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit von Buna 
und Schlesien-Benzin in Auschwitz, January 18, 1941, NI-11784. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Insti-
tuts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution Document Book (= PDB) 72 (g), pp. 
18–28, here p. 23. In mid-December 1940, Wilhelm Biedenkopf, the director of Buna-Werke 
Schkopau, also took part in the exploratory trips of the Leunawerke fuel experts, cf. Bespre-
chung in der Kokserei Odertal der Gräfl. Schaffgotschen Werke am 16.12.1940, NI-11110. Ar-
chiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 3–13, 
here p. 8. 
8  Niederschrift über die Sitzung des TEA am Mittwoch, den 13.12.1939 in Berlin [excerpt], Bü-
125. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, 
Bütefisch Defense Document Book (= DDB) VIII (g), pp. 78–79, here p. 78. 
9  The members of the commission were its head, Direktor Scharf (I.G. Bergwerke), who soon 
was represented by Heinrich Bütefisch because of illness, Direktor Dr. Lehmann (Essen), Di-
rektor Dr. Lennartz (Halle/S), and a mining engineer, Bergassessor Stein (Recklinghausen), as 
well as the Leunawerke technical manager, an expert in coal carbonization, Dr. Friedrich 
Henning; cf. Dr. Friedrich Henning, affidavit [excerpt], October 13, 1947, Bü-176. Archiv der 
Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Bütefisch DDB 
VIII (g), p. 86. 
10  The expert opinion dated July 2, 1940, is not included in the volumes of documents from the 
Farben Trial. The dating is based on an additional opinion, prepared later, cf. Stein, Lennartz, 
Lehmann, Die Kohleversorgung der I.G. Werke in Oberschlesien (Grubenfelder Pless). 2. 
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plant.‖11 At an I.G. Farben management board meeting on November 14, 1940, 
Bütefisch explained the plan to acquire a controlling interest in Fürstengrube AG, 
and it was endorsed by the board.12 The board‘s decision to conclude a contract 
with Pless regarding the founding of Fürstengrube GmbH fits into the chronologi-
cal procedures of the location decision for Auschwitz. As former I.G. Farben em-
ployee Hans Deichmann testified, he was present at a meeting between Fritz ter 
Meer and Georg von Schnitzler on November 12, 1940, at which the two Farben 
board members agreed to propose Auschwitz as the location for building a fourth 
Buna plant the following day in the Central Committee, the board‘s top commit-
tee.13 The preliminary decision in principle in favor of I.G. Auschwitz was dis-
cussed and made the next day, on November 13, 1940, in the Central 
Committee as part of the ―General Debate.‖14 The order given by the board on 
November 14, 1940, to proceed promptly with the conclusion of the sales 
agreement with Pless, makes sense only against this background.15 Thus the 
Fürstengrube coal mine, located near Auschwitz, was to supply the raw material 
and energy for Farben‘s construction project in Auschwitz, which had been ap-
                                       
Nachtrag zu dem Gutachten vom 2. Juli 1940, February 20, 1941, NI-12012. Archiv des Fritz 
Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 80 (g), pp. 3–16. 
11  Günther Falkenhahn, affidavit, September 30, 1947, NI-12010. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Insti-
tuts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 81 (g), not paginated. Historian Bernd C. 
Wagner noticed that Falkenhahn‘s statement and the expert opinion on the properties of the 
Fürstengrube coal seams in summer 1940 cannot be satisfactorily placed in a chronology of 
the historical events that were part of the location decision if—as has been the case thus far in 
historical scholarship—one assumes that the building of a Buna plant in Auschwitz was first 
considered by Farben in fall 1940, after construction work in Rattwitz was halted in July 1940 
(cf. Wagner: IG Auschwitz, pp. 245–246). On the other hand, if one considers the possibility 
that in summer 1940, employees of Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH and Mineralölbau 
GmbH were planning the construction of a fuel synthesis plant in Auschwitz, the intended ac-
quisition of Fürstengrube by I.G. Farben is comprehensible. In this regard, see: Schmaltz / 
Roth: ―Neue Dokumente,‖ pp. 108–110. 
12  Notizen des Herrn Buhl über die 22. Vorstandssitzung vom 14.11.1940 [excerpt], Bü-276. 
Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Büte-
fisch DDB VIII (g), pp. 83–85, here pp. 84–85. See also the affidavit of the secretary of board 
member Buhl: Siegrun Bojunga, affidavit, February 9, 1948, Bü-276. Archiv der Stiftung für 
Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Bütefisch DDB VIII (g), pp. 
83–85, here p. 83f. 
13  Cf. letter from Hans Deichmann to Peter Hayes, August 6, 1990. In: Hans Deichmann / Peter 
Hayes: ―Standort Auschwitz: Eine Kontroverse über die Entscheidungsgründe für den Bau des 
I.G. Farben-Werks in Auschwitz.‖ In: 1999. Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. 
Jahrhunderts 11 (1998), no. 1, pp. 79–101, Document 2, p. 84. 
14  I.G. Farbenindustrie, Zentralausschuss-Büro, Tagesordnung für die ZA-Sitzung am 13.11.1940 
in Frankfurt a.M., November 8, 1940. Industrie und Filmmuseum Wolfen / Unternehmensar-
chiv Filmfabrik Wolfen, A 1696, p. 312. 
15  This decision supports Deichmann‘s dating of the conversation on November 12, 1940, which 
Hayes challenges, cf. Deichmann / Hayes: ―Standort Auschwitz,‖ here: Document 3, p. 85, 
and Document 13, p. 96. 
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proved the previous day. In the further probing of the Auschwitz location, the 
coal mine figured prominently in the building of the Buna plant. In Ludwigshafen, 
in mid-January 1941, when board member Otto Ambros once again weighed the 
pros and cons of the Auschwitz location for the fourth Buna plant, he attributed 
great significance to the well-developed preliminary work of the managers from 
Leuna and the corporation‘s mining experts with regard to acquisition by I.G. 
Farben, because the fourth Buna plant was to be built ―as close to the coal as 
possible.‖16 The purchase agreement for the Pless coal mines, prepared under 
the guidance of Bütefisch, was ―already exchanged‖ by I.G. Farben and ready for 
signing by mid-January 1941.17 In early February, the ―coal supply from the 
Fürstengrube mine, 18 kilometers away,‖ for the the future I.G. plant in Ausch-
witz was regarded as ―guaranteed by now.‖18 On February 8, 1941, the I.G. Far-
ben managers signed a limited liability company agreement with Pless, giving 
Farben a 51-percent majority and thus an exclusive right of direct purchase for 
the new large-scale project.19 The construction volume of the plant, labeled I.G. 
Auschwitz, was more than 770 million Reichsmark, which made it I.G. Farben‘s 
largest investment project in the 1940s.20 With its innovative technological 
combination of high-pressure chemistry and acetylene chemistry, I.G. Auschwitz 
not only was intended to meet the military demands of the army, air force, and 
navy for synthetic fuels and Buna rubber, but was designed simultaneously to 
expand the product range by adding plastics, which had a promising future.21 
                                       
16  Schlesien-Benzin Wk/S., Besprechung am 16.1.1941 in Ludwigshafen über Möglichkeiten der 
Zusammenarbeit von Buna und Schlesien-Benzin in Auschwitz, January 18, 1941, NI-11784. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 18–28, 
here p. 18. 
17  Ibid., p. 18f. 
18  Fritz ter Meer, Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung mit Herrn Krauch am 6. Februar 1941 
(Geheim), Betr. Buna IV, February 10, 1941, NI-11113. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 47–50, here p. 47. 
19  The bulky agreement on the founding of Fürstengrube GmbH on February 8, 1941, is ex-
cerpted in: NI-12011. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, 
PDB 80 (g), pp. 17–51. 
20  Information regarding the size of the investment varies: Peter Hayes: ―Die IG Farbenindustrie 
und die Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen im Werk Auschwitz.‖ In: Hermann Kaienburg, ed.: 
Konzentrationslager und deutsche Wirtschaft 1939–1945 (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), 
pp. 129–148, here p. 142, fn. 38, gives the amount as 776 million RM, while Gottfried 
Plumpe, in Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. Wirtschaft, Technik und Politik 1904–1945 (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1990), p. 595, takes 569 million RM as a starting point.  
21  Karl Heinz Roth: ―I.G. Auschwitz. Normalität oder Anomalie eines kapitalistischen 
Entwicklungssprungs?‖ In: Hamburger Stiftung zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur, 
ed.: „Deutsche Wirtschaft.― Zwangsarbeit von KZ-Häftlingen für Industrie und Behörden. 
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In the end, several factors were decisive for the choice of location: Besides the 
large, level, flood-proof building site, which was expropriated from the Polish 
owners by the occupation authorities and made available at low cost, there was a 
guaranteed supply of water from the nearby rivers and of cheap energy from the 
expropriated Upper Silesian coal mines.22 Because there was already a serious 
manpower shortage in Upper Silesia in early 1941, due to other construction 
projects, the commitment of the SS, made before building began, to supply 
thousands of prisoners from the nearby Auschwitz concentration camp as labor-
ers was an additional factor in determining the choice of location.23 In early Janu-
ary 1941, Otto Ambros, the Farben board member involved in planning the Buna 
factory in Auschwitz, learned of the plans made by the SS for a substantial in-
crease in the size of the Auschwitz concentration camp, and of the impending 
forced expulsion of Poles and Jews from the town of Auschwitz and the sur-
rounding villages.24 The forced resettlement was arranged by the occupation au-
thorities in Upper Silesia under the direction of the local representatives of the 
Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of the German Nation (RKF, 
Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums), Heinrich Himmler, and 
was embedded in a comprehensive concept of Germanization based on ethnic 
                                       
Symposium ‚Wirtschaft und Konzentrationslager‗ (Hamburg: VSA, 1991), pp. 79–95, here p. 
86. 
22  Berthold Puchert: ―Aus der Praxis der IG Farben in Auschwitz-Monowitz.‖ In: Jahrbuch für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1963, II, pp. 203–211, here pp. 204 and 206; also, Berthold Puchert: 
―Fragen der Wirtschaftspolitik des deutschen Faschismus im okkupierten Polen 1939 bis 1945, 
mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der IG Farbenindustrie AG‖ (professorial dissertation, 
unpublished, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, 1968), here pp. 301–311; Morris: ―Development,‖ 
pp. 330ff.; Hayes: Industry and Ideology, pp. 347–361; Roth: ―I.G. Auschwitz,‖ p. 86; 
Wagner: IG Auschwitz, pp. 44–55. 
23  On the controversy regarding the significance of the prisoner labor force in the location deci-
sion, cf. Peter Hayes: ―Zur umstrittenen Geschichte der I.G. Farbenindustrie AG.‖ In: Ge-
schichte und Gesellschaft 18 (1992), no. 3, pp. 405–417, and the reply by Gottfried Plumpe: 
―Antwort auf Peter Hayes.‖ In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 18 (1992), no. 4, pp. 526–532, as 
well as the response of Thomas Sandkühler / Hans Walter Schmuhl: ―Noch einmal: Die I.G. 
Farben und Auschwitz.‖ In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 19 (1992), no. 2, pp. 259–267; 
Franciszek Piper: Arbeitseinsatz der Häftlinge aus dem KL Auschwitz (Oświęcim: Auschwitz-
Birkenau State Museum, 1995), p. 239; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, pp. 37–58; Schmaltz / Roth: 
―Neue Dokumente,‖ pp. 100ff. 
24  Director Simmat (Mineralöl-Baugesellschaft GmbH) to Ambros, January 11, 1941, and 
enclosure: Auszug aus dem Besprechungsbericht vom 10.12.1940 (Kattowitz). Betr.: Bau-
gelände für 2 neue Hydrieranlagen [Excerpt from the meeting report for December 10, 1940 
(Kattowitz), regarding site for two new hydrogenation facilities], January 11, 1941, NI-11783. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), p. 17. 
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policy.25 In late January 1941, Ambros received additional information about the 
plans of the SS for expansion, according to which the Auschwitz concentration 
camp with its approximately 7,000 inmates was to be enlarged to a ―an area of 
around 10 square kilometers for a concentration camp settlement‖ and there 
would be a possibility of ―employing prisoners in the construction project follow-
ing negotiations with the Reichsführer SS.‖26 Thus, in the region around Ausch-
witz, the demographic policy schemes of Himmler as RKF affected the building of 
the I.G. Auschwitz plant with regard to three central points: First, through the 
impending withdrawal of the regionally available workforce owing to the racist 
settlement policy, which called for forcible expulsion of the Polish and Jewish 
population; second, regarding the potential for employing concentration camp 
prisoners at I.G. Farben‘s future plant construction site; and third, on account of 
the purchase negotiations for the construction site, which was under the admin-
istration of Himmler as RKF. 
After the far-reaching resettlement plans became known to the management 
board of I.G. Farben, the firm‘s top executives immediately established commu-
nication with Himmler to secure access to the potential labor force of workers 
threatened with deportation, as a source of manpower for building their plant in 
Auschwitz. At the request of Ambros, Carl Krauch, the chairman of Farben‘s su-
pervisory board, in his function as General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions 
of Chemical Production, took the initiative and proposed that his boss Hermann 
Göring give an indicatory order for Farben‘s planned construction project in 
Auschwitz. The decree sent to Himmler by Göring on February 18, 1941, pro-
vided for delaying the intended expulsion of the potential workforce of non-
Jewish Poles in the Auschwitz region until such time as the plant was completed, 
and for supplying as many concentration camp prisoners as possible for the 
                                       
25  Roth: ―I.G. Auschwitz,‖ p. 82f.; Götz Aly / Susanne Heim: Vordenker der Vernichtung. Ausch-
witz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
1993), pp. 168–197; Robert-Jan van Pelt / Debórah Dwork: Auschwitz. Von 1270 bis heute 
(Zürich/Munich: Pendo, 1998), pp. 163ff.; Sybille Steinbacher: ‚Musterstadt Auschwitz.‗ Ger-
manisierungspolitik und Judenmord in Oberschlesien (Munich: Saur, 2000), pp. 79–138. 
26  Camill Santo, Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung mit der Landesplanung in Kattowitz [file 
memo on a discussion with the regional planning office in Kattowitz], January 31, 1941, NI-
11785. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 
29–39, here p. 33f. 
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building of the Buna plant.27 Accordingly, on February 27, 1941, the Reichsführer 
SS, Heinrich Himmler, instructed the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Richard 
Glück, and the Chief of the SS Main Office for Budget and Construction, Oswald 
Pohl, ―to support the construction project with prisoners from the concentration 
camp to every extent possible.‖28 On March 1, 1941, Himmler made an initial in-
spection trip to Auschwitz, where he appeared ―very pleased‖ with ―the progress 
and the work accomplished in the concentration camp,‖ as the report on the visit 
stated.29 At the end of the visit, the Reichsführer SS ordered the camp comman-
dant, Rudolf Höss, to enlarge the Auschwitz concentration camp. According to 
Höss, Himmler not only gave the order to expand the concentration camp to hold 
―30,000 prisoners in peacetime,‖ but also directed that an additional camp for 
100,000 prisoners of war be erected in the area of the village of Birkenau 
(Brzezinka).30 As more recent research has shown, this information regarding 
Himmler‘s visit in March 1941, which was reconstructed from memory by Höss 
after the war‘s end, is doubtful to some extent.31 While the particulars on the fur-
                                       
27  Göring to Himmler, letter: Betr. Bevölkerungspolitische Maßnahmen für das Buna-Werk 
Auschwitz in Ostoberschlesien (Geheime Reichssache) [Re.: demographic policy measures for 
the Auschwitz Buna plant in Eastern Upper Silesia (Secret Reich Business)], February 18, 
1941, NI-1240. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 
(g), pp. 66–67, here p. 66. 
28  Cf. Krauch to Otto Ambros, letter: Betr. Bunawerk IV Auschwitz, gez. i.A. Wirth [Re.: 
Bunawerk IV at Auschwitz, signed Wirth], March 4, 1941, NI-11086. Archiv des Fritz Bauer In-
stituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 107–114, here p. 114. 
29  SS-Untersturmführer Heinrich Schwarz, (Auschwitz concentration camp, prisoner deployment 
I/5): Monatsbericht der Außenstelle I/3 an den Leiter der Hauptabteilung I/5 Hauptamt Haus-
halt und Bauten [monthly report of Aussenstelle I/3 to the head of Hauptabteilung I/5, Main 
Office for Budget and Construction] [Burböck], March 17, 1941. Archiwum Państwowe 
Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, D-AuI-3a/1, p. 47. 
30  Rudolf Höss: Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen (Munich: dtv, 
1996), p. 271. This account was followed by, among other, Danuta Czech: Kalendarium der 
Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau 1939–1945 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1989), p. 79; Irena Strzelecka / Piotr Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau, der Ausbau und die Ent-
wicklung des KL Auschwitz.‖ In: Wacław Długoborski / Franciszek Piper, eds.: Auschwitz 
1940–1945. Studien zur Geschichte des Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagers Auschwitz 
(Oświęcim: Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 73–155, here p. 81, and 
Piotr Setkiewicz: ―Ausgewählte Probleme aus der Geschichte des IG Werkes Auschwitz.‖ In: 
Hefte von Auschwitz 22 (2002), pp. 7–147, here p. 28. Wagner, who mentions Steinbacher‘s 
objections to the date of March 1, 1941, also says that in March 1941 Himmler ordered ―con-
crete planning for setting up a concentration with a capacity of 100,000 inmates near the vil-
lage of Birkenau,‖ cf. Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 58 and p. 209, fn. 6. 
31  Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Ham-
burg, Peter Witte et al., eds. (Hamburg: Christians, 1999), p. 123, fn. 2; Steinbacher: 
‚Musterstadt‘, p. 211; Karin Orth: Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. 
Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), p. 100, fn. 140, 
and p. 144; Rainer Fröbe: ―Bauen und vernichten. Die Zentralbauleitung Auschwitz und die 
‚Endlösung‗.‖ In: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 16 (2000), pp. 155–209, 
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ther project planning for the main camp are entirely in conformity with the sur-
viving sources,32 there is no evidence at all in the contemporary sources to sup-
port the dating of the order to expand the Birkenau camp to March 1, 1941, the 
date used in numerous historical studies.33 Not until September 26, 1941, did 
SS-Oberführer Hans Kammler, Chief of the Main Office for Budget and Construc-
tion, give the oral and, on the following day, the written, order to construct the 
Auschwitz prisoner of war camp.34 Höss‘s claim that Himmler met with top I.G. 
Farben managers during this visit and once again confirmed to them the agree-
ment to ―provide 10,000 prisoners as needed and depending on the progress of 
the structures,‖35 however, was not questioned by more recent research.36 
Himmler‘s order of March 1941 called for the erecting of additional prisoner 
housing facilities in the Auschwitz main camp in order to accommodate the 
prisoner detachments designated for the expansion of I.G. Farben‘s Monowitz 
plant. At the end of March 1941, the key points of the deployment of prisoners 
were set forth in several top-level discussions between I.G. Farben and the SS 
leadership. The daily flat rate for hiring each concentration camp prisoner, 
payable by I.G. Farben to the SS, was RM 3 per unskilled worker and RM 4 per 
skilled worker, for a work day of 10 to 12 hours in summer and at least 9 hours 
in winter.37 By the end of 1941, the Buna external labor detachment was to 
reach a size of 1,000 to no more than 1,500 prisoners. In accordance with the 
request of I.G. Farben‘s construction management, the Auschwitz camp com-
mandant, Rudolf Höss, agreed to increase the Buna detachment to 3,000–4,000 
                                       
here p. 159 and p. 199, fn. 12. For a detailed, source-critical discussion of the account given 
by Höss, see: Karin Orth: ―Rudolf Höss und die ‚Endlösung der Judenfrage.‗ Drei Argumente 
gegen die Datierung auf den Sommer 1941.‖ In: Werkstatt Geschichte 18 (1997), pp. 45–58. 
32  Reichsführer SS (Head of the Main Office for Budget and Construction), general development 
plan for Auschwitz, June 1941, documented in: van Pelt / Dwork: Auschwitz, Table 6 (follow-
ing p. 200); Strzelecka / Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ p. 86f. 
33  Steinbacher: ‚Musterstadt‘, p. 211; Jan Erik Schulte: Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung: Das 
Wirtschaftsimperium der SS. Oswald Pohl und das Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt 1933–
1945 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), p. 337. 
34  Steinbacher: ‚Musterstadt‘, p. 38f.; Fröbe: ―Bauen und vernichten,‖ pp. 159 and 199, fn. 12; 
Jan Erik Schulte: ―Vom Arbeits- zum Vernichtungslager. Die Entstehungsgeschichte von 
Auschwitz-Birkenau 1941/42.‖ In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 50 (2002), no. 1, pp. 
41–69, here p. 50. 
35  Höss: Kommandant, p. 271; Czech: Kalendarium, p. 79.  
36  Steinbacher: ‚Musterstadt‘, p. 211; Schulte: Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung, S. 337.  
37  Besuchsbericht. Besprechung mit dem Lagerkommandanten des Konzentrationslagers bei 
Auschwitz am 27.3.1941, gez. Dürrfeld, Leuna-Werke, den 30.3.1941, NI-15148, pp. 1–4, 
here p. 2. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
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prisoners in 1942, provided the ―necessary accommodations in the camp for in-
creasing the previous number of 8,000 prisoners have been created.‖38 In the 
following months, I.G. Farben and the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau, headed 
by Carl Krauch, supported the expansion of the Auschwitz concentration camp. 
For that purpose, the I.G. Auschwitz construction management provided the ne-
cessary code numbers for obtaining strategic building materials, which were re-
quired for the prisoner buildings, laundry shop, delousing facility with prisoner 
bath, two commandant‘s office buildings, electrically charged fences surrounding 
the concentration camp, and crew housing for the SS guard force.39 
The Buna “Aussenkommando” (April 1941 to July 1942) 
In mid-April 1941, the Buna external labor detachment (Aussenkommando) left 
camp and headed for I.G. Farben‘s plant construction site in Auschwitz-Monowitz 
for the first time. On April 21, 1941, this labor brigade consisted of 150 concen-
tration camp prisoners.40 The prevailing euphoria of Farben‘s construction ex-
perts at the ―fine, trouble-free work‖41 with the concentration camp quickly 
vanished when it became clear that the deployment of prisoners was linked with 
transportation problems and repeated conflicts between Farben‘s construction 
management and the SS regarding the strict control and supervision of the 
prisoners at the construction site. In the early days, the prisoners were trans-
ported daily by truck to the plant construction site 6–7 kilometers east of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. After the Buna detachment had soon grown to a 
workforce of several hundred men, the use of trucks was discontinued.42 Starting 
in May 1941, the prisoners had to make the long trip from the main camp to the 
plant construction site and back each day on foot. The march of many kilometers 
                                       
38  Ibid., p. 1. 
39  On this, see the building programs in: Florian Schmaltz: ―Die IG Farbenindustrie und der Aus-
bau des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz 1941–1942.‖ In: Sozial.Geschichte. Zeitschrift für 
historische Analyse des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts 21 (2006), no. 1, pp. 33–67, here pp. 55–
60. 
40  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 3 für die Zeit vom 14.4. bis 5.5.1941, NI-14737, p. 1. Ar-
chiv des Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung (Berlin), Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie; 
Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 64f. 
41  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 1 für die Zeit vom 24. bis 27.3.1941, 1.4.1941, gez. Murr, 
NI-14528, p. 1. Archiv des Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung (Berlin), Nürnberger Do-
kumente, NI-Serie. 
42  Strzelecka / Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ p. 125. 
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robbed the already ailing and undernourished prisoners of their last reserves of 
strength and increased the mortality rate. In the eyes of the plant management, 
the prisoners‘ strenuous march was a useless physical wastage of manpower, 
which diminished performance and consumed many hours of valuable work time. 
In late July 1941, therefore, the plant management arranged for the Reichsbahn 
to convey the prisoners between the concentration camp and the train station in 
the village of Dwory, located at the northern edge of the plant grounds. The 
transport of 1,000 to 1,300 prisoners of the Buna detachment, accompanied by 
SS guards, in 10 to 12 Reichsbahn freight cars remained inconvenient and time-
consuming.43 In fall 1941, when Wehrmacht transports to the Eastern Front also 
were routed onto the already overburdened railroad line, these troop transports 
were given the right of way and frequently caused train traffic to be delayed by 
hours. In late December 1941, construction work was largely interrupted by 
heavy frost, and rail transport was discontinued.44 Not later than March 1942, 
the use of prisoners was augmented once again and the Reichsbahn transports 
were resumed.45 By October 21, 1941, the plant manager of I.G. Auschwitz had 
suggested to the camp commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, 
Rudolf Höss, that accommodations directly on the firm‘s premises be arranged 
for all the 4,000 to 5,000 concentration camp prisoners who were scheduled to 
work on plant construction in the following year. This push by the I.G. Farben 
managers was tantamount to a demand for setting up a subcamp of the concen-
tration camp. At this time, Höss professed himself unable to comply with the 
wish of the plant management because of a shortage of guard personnel and re-
sources.46 Nonetheless, agreement was reached on the permanent housing of 
                                       
43  Letter from Reichsbahndirektion Oppeln to Deutsche Reichsbahn, Eisenbahnabteilungen des 
Reichsverkehrsministeriums, Betr.: Beförderung von Häftlingen des Konzentrationslagers 
Auschwitz, February 28, 1942, Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 5/3056, p. 480. 
44  Cf. I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 33 für die Zeit vom 5. bis 11.1.1942, gez. Faust, NI-
15109, p. 1. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-
Serie; Strzelecka / Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ p. 127; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 74. 
45  Strzelecka and Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ p. 127, fn. 88, referring to: Secret message from Pas-
tor Konrad Szweda. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Mat. RO, Vol. 12, p. 2 
[IZ-12/89, p. 45f.]. 
46  The reasoning behind Höss‘s refusal (lack of personnel and resources), recorded in the I.G. 
Auschwitz weekly report, indicates that the I.G. construction management did not expect the 
SS to build the Monowitz concentration camp, but instead planned as early as late October 
1941 to do the construction work itself. Otherwise, Höss could have adduced the obvious ar-
gument that having the SS build another camp at the plant construction site was out of the 
question because of shortages of construction materials, cf. excerpt from: [Faust], I.G. Far-
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200 prisoners from the Buna detachment in two Reich Labor Service (RAD, 
Reichsarbeitsdienst) barracks at the construction site, in the immediate vicinity 
of the ready-mixed-concrete buildings. This decision marks a significant step on 
the way to creation of the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp. Among scholars, 
there is debate about the exact dating of the start of construction for the 
Buna/Monowitz camp.47 The policy decision to build a corporate concentration 
camp on the plant grounds was made around the turn of the year 1941/42, and 
was mutually agreed on by the plant management of I.G. Auschwitz and the 
firm‘s top executives.48 On January 8, 1942, I.G. Farben‘s Technical Committee, 
which was responsible for loan allocation, finally approved a proposal that in-
cluded the financing of what later became the Buna/Monowitz concentration 
camp, known in-house as ―Camp IV.‖49 The construction site manager of I.G. 
Auschwitz began building the camp in March 1942: that is, even before obtaining 
approval from the SS commandant‘s office in the negotiations for erection of the 
subcamp on the plant grounds. Besides the three barracks camps already sche-
duled and intended to house a workforce of 15,000 to 20,000 men for I.G. 
Auschwitz,  plans now called for building a fourth camp in Monowitz for 5,000 
workers.50 This established a new division of responsibilities in the collaboration 
                                       
benindustrie AG – Werk Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 22 für die Zeit vom 20. bis 26.10.1941, 
October 27, 1941. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, D-Au-III Monowitz/4, 
Tygoniowe sprawozdania IG Farben, t. 2, p. 104. 
47  Shmuel Krakowski dates the start of construction to late 1941: Shmuel Krakowski: ―The Sate-
lite Camps.‖ In: Yisrael Gutman, ed.: Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1994), pp. 50–60, here p. 52. This is disputed by Bernd C. Wagner, who assumes 
that ―the decision to build was not made until summer 1942,‖ cf. Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 
247, fn. 209; on this, see also p. 94. 
48  This was confirmed unanimously, under oath, by several former I.G. Farben managers before 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. Cf. Walther Dürrfeld, affidavit, February 18, 1947, NI-4184. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 115–
119, here p. 116; Carl Krauch, affidavit, February 13, 1947, NI-4033. Archiv des Fritz Bauer 
Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 105–106, here p. 106; Otto 
Ambros, affidavit, April 22, 1947, NI-9542. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 80–104, here p. 92, and also PDB 75 (g), pp. 1–25, 
here p. 13. 
49  I.G. Auschwitz, Kaufmännische Abteilung an TEA-Büro, February 8, 1943, enclosure: I.G. 
Auschwitz, Unterkunftsbaracken Stand 31.12.1942, February 6, 1943, NI-2777. National 
Archives Washington, National Archives Microfilm Publications NI-Series Original German Do-
cuments, Microfilm T 301, reel 140, and Aufstellung der in der Sitzung des Technischen Aus-
schusses am 8. Januar 1942 in Frankfurt a.M. vorliegenden Kreditanforderungen. Industrie 
und Filmmuseum Wolfen / Unternehmensarchiv Filmfabrik Wolfen, A 1529, p. 32. 
50  I.G. Werk Auschwitz, Protokoll der 16. Baubesprechung am 6.3.1942 in Ludwigshafen, March 
28, 1942, NI-11132. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, 
PDB 73 (g), pp. 140–165, here p. 147. The erection of the branch camp in Monowitz was the 
―subject of repeated discussions in the site consultation meetings,‖ as Camill Santo, a site 
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between I.G. Farben and the SS. The SS, as owner of the slave laborers, re-
tained full power of control over the prisoners, whose labor was hired out in re-
turn for a fee. The SS remained the provider of the concentration camp prisoners 
and was responsible for guarding them. I.G. Auschwitz, by sharing in the con-
struction costs for the concentration camp and financing the housing of the 
prisoners, assumed part of the reproduction cost for the prisoner workforce. That 
had been rejected, as late as spring 1941, by the construction management for 
I.G. Auschwitz in the negotiations with the SS regarding the amount of the per 
capita daily flat rate payable for prisoner labor.51 The formal assent of the SS 
commandant‘s office to the conversion of ―Camp IV‖ into a concentration camp 
was obtained by the I.G. plant management in late June 1942.52 On July 17 and 
18, 1942, Himmler once again made a two-day inspection trip to Auschwitz, 
viewed the camp and the SS undertakings, and was briefed by the I.G. construc-
tion management on the chemical plant that was being built.53 Shortly after 
Himmler‘s departure, on July 21, 1942, the work deployment administrator at 
the concentration camp, SS-Obersturmbannführer Heinrich Schwarz, notified the 
I.G. plant management of a camp lockdown, as a result of which—because of the 
high risk of typhus infection—―no more prisoners [would] be deployed on the 
plant grounds.‖54 Two days later, Höss issued a garrison order for a ―total camp 
                                       
manager for I.G. Auschwitz, explained after the war. I.G. Auschwitz, he said, in seeking its 
objective had encountered ―quite a few difficulties on the part of the SS.‖ Finally, however, 
the SS declared itself willing ―to comply with the wish of the IG to accommodate the prisoners 
at the IG construction site.‖ Cf. Camill Santo, affidavit, August 1, 1947, NI-9820, pp. 1–8, 
here p. 5. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
51  Besuchsbericht [record of visit]. Besprechung mit dem Lagerkommandanten des 
Konzentrationslagers bei Auschwitz am 27.3.1941, gez. Dürrfeld, Leuna-Werke, March 30, 
1941, NI-15148, pp. 1–4, here p. 2. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürn-
berger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
52  Excerpt from: Wochenbericht Nr. 57 für die Zeit vom 22. bis 28.6.1942 – I. Teil – Vorbericht 
22.6.–25.6., gez. Faust, NI-14524. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgepro-
zess Fall VI, Prosecution Exhibit 2126, reel 034, pp. 122–124; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 94. 
53  Höss: Kommandant, p. 243, pp. 270ff.; Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42, pp. 187–
190. On the viewing of the plant grounds of I.G. Auschwitz, cf. excerpt from: Wochenbericht 
Nr. 60/61 für die Zeit vom 13.7. bis 26.7.1942, gez. Faust, NI-14551. Archiv des Fritz Bauer 
Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution Exhibit 1991, reel 033, pp. 353–
355, here p. 354f., and Roth: ―IG Auschwitz,‖ p. 85 and p. 92, fn. 27. 
54  Excerpt from: Wochenbericht Nr. 60/61 für die Zeit vom 13.7. bis 26.7.1942, gez. Faust, NI-
14551. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution 
Exhibit 1991, reel 033, pp. 353–355, here p. 355. In the relevant literature, there is a wide-
spread but inaccurate claim that the deployment of prisoners in the Buna-Kommando was in-
terrupted from August to October 1942, cf. Antoni Makowski: ―Organisation, Entwicklung und 
Tätigkeit des Häftlings-Krankenbaus in Monowitz (KL Auschwitz III).‖ In: Hefte von Auschwitz 
15 (1975), pp. 113–181, here p. 114; Piper: Arbeitseinsatz, p. 241. 
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lockdown.‖55 The abrupt absence of the 2,000 or more prisoners who were part 
of the Buna external detachment greatly intensified the already existing labor 
shortage in late July 1942, right in the middle of the building season.56 The camp 
lockdown crippled substantial parts of the construction site.57 Not until mid-
August 1942, when Organisation Todt assisted with the building of the concen-
tration camp, did work speed up again.58 Nonetheless, completion of the camp 
was delayed for weeks by bottlenecks in the delivery of wire mesh and barbed 
wire.59 Thus, as late as the first week of September, the electrically charged 
―double ring fence‖ for the camp was still unfinished.60 The electric fence re-
quired by the SS was built, at the order of the I.G. Auschwitz plant management, 
by the firm‘s specialized personnel with construction materials from the ware-
houses of the SS.61 Along the camp fence were installed sentry towers, 4 meters 
high and equipped with searchlights, for the armed SS guards.62 For a subcamp, 
the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp was exceptionally large in terms of its 
physical dimensions. According to a ―construction volume report‖ by the con-
struction site management of I.G. Auschwitz in September 1942, a total of 57 
―workers‘ housing barracks,‖ five washroom barracks, and five double latrine 
                                       
55  Standortbefehl Nr. 19/42, gez. Höß, July 23, 1942. In: Norbert Frei / Thomas Grotum / Jan 
Parcer / Sybille Steinbacher / Bernd C. Wagner, eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle 
des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz 1940–1945 (Munich: Saur 2000), p. 155. 
56  This figure for the strength of the Buna-Kommando is taken from a chart for May 1942, cf. 
Arbeitseinsatz Werk Auschwitz. – Stand Mai 1942 – Soll-Bedarf 1942, NI-11134, p. 1. Archiv 
der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. This chart is an 
enclosure for a letter from Otto Ambros to Krauch: Einschreiben, June 10, 1942, NI-11135. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 73 (g), pp. 186–
189. See also Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 82. 
57  Excerpt from: Wochenbericht Nr. 60/61 für die Zeit vom 13.7. bis 26.7.1942, gez. Faust, NI-
14551. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution 
Exhibit 1991, reel 033, pp. 353–355, here p. 353. 
58  Letter: Faust an Santo, Eisfeld, Mach, Kaiser, Dürrfeld, von Lom, Höpke, Sitzenstuhl, Betr.: 
Einsatz einer Bauleitung der Aussenstelle Breslau der Abteilung Rüstungsbau des Reichsmi-
nisters für Bewaffnung und Munition, August 17, 1942, OA-421. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozial-
geschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Ambros DDB VII (g), p. 47. 
59  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht 66/67 für die Zeit vom 24.8. bis 6.9.1942, NI-14555, p. 2. 
Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
60  I.G. Auschwitz, 20. Baubesprechung am 8.9.1942 in Auschwitz O/S, September 24, 1942, NI-
11138. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 
72–101, here p. 77. 
61  Rudolf Dömming, affidavit, August 28, 1947, NI-10930, p. 4. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialge-
schichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente. NI-Serie, and Friedrich Killet, affidavit, July 15, 
1947, Dü-108. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB I (g), 
pp. 87–89, here p. 88. 
62  Rudolf Dömming, affidavit, August 28, 1947, NI-10930, p. 5. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialge-
schichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
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barracks were scheduled.63 On September 23, 1942, SS-Obergruppenführer 
Oswald Pohl, in the meantime promoted to head of the SS Economic and 
Administrative Main Office (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt, WVHA), 
was received in Auschwitz by I.G. Farben managers, including management 
board member Otto Ambros, and briefed, at his request, on the ―overall situation 
of the plant.‖64 In the process, Pohl held out the prospect of the prompt provision 
of the prisoners requested by October 15, 1942, the expected completion date of 
the concentration camp.65 The I.G. Farben construction site management did not 
yield to the new demands presented by the SS camp commandant‘s office on 
October 2, 1942, calling for building of an additional prison, various detention 
cells, a mortuary for 30 to 40 corpses, and an autopsy room in the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, because this would have placed the date of 
the camp‘s completion in question once again.66 At the same time, the conclusion 
of the construction work—and thus the opening date for the Buna/Monowitz con-
centration camp—was delayed another two weeks. 
The Opening of the Buna/Monowitz Camp – Demographics of the 
Prisoner Population  
In late October 1942, the SS transferred an initial group of prisoner functionaries 
from the Auschwitz main camp to the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.67 The 
first transport earmarked for Buna/Monowitz, a group of 405 prisoners from the 
Buchenwald concentration camp, had arrived in Auschwitz on the evening of 
October 19.68 Of the prisoners in this transport, who were housed in the main 
                                       
63  Anlage zu Bauvolumenmeldung BU-Anlage Auschwitz, September 22, 1942. Bundesarchiv 
Berlin, R 8128/A 2000, pp. 217–218. 
64  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht 70/71 für die Zeit vom 21. Sept. bis 4. Okt. 1942, gez. Faust, 
NI-14489, p. 1. Archiv des Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung (Berlin), Nürnberger Do-
kumente, NI-Serie. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid., p. 2. 
67  Wagner dates the opening of the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp on October 28, 1942, cf. 
Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 97. Irena Strzelecka and Piotr Setkiewicz, however, assume that 
the first prisoner functionaries were transferred to the Buna-Monowitz concentration camp as 
early as October 26 and 27, 1942, cf. Strzelecka / Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ p. 129, fn. 91; 
Setkiewicz: ―Ausgewählte Probleme,‖ pp. 46–47. 
68  Copy: Liebehenschel, SS-WVHA Amtsgruppe D - Konz.-Lager DII/1 23/4 So/Ha. an die Lager-
kommandanten Buchenwald und Auschwitz, nachrichtlich Chef des Amtes D I/1, Betr.: Über-
stellung jüdischer Häftlinge, October 12, 1942, NI-10854. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
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camp at first, the SS had 76 gassed in Birkenau in the next few days.69 On Octo-
ber 27, 1942, another deportation train, bringing 841 Jewish prisoners from the 
Westerbork concentration camp in the Netherlands, reached Auschwitz. Only 224 
men who were selected as being ―fit for work‖ were transferred to the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp; all the others were gassed in Birkenau.70 Two 
days later, a transport including Jewish, German, Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian pris-
oners from the Dachau concentration camp arrived at the main camp; they were to 
be deployed at the construction site of I.G. Farben‘s Buna plant.71 On October 30, 
1942, around 800 male prisoners from the German Reich were selected by the 
SS in the main camp as ―fit for work‖ and moved to Auschwitz-Monowitz.72 By the 
last weekend of October 1942, 2,100 prisoners had arrived in Monowitz.73 Under 
questioning in the compensation lawsuit brought against I.G. Farben by Norbert 
Wollheim after the war, Josef Löwenstein—who in October 1942 was among the 
first prisoners transferred to Buna/Monowitz in a transport of around 600 prison-
ers from Buchenwald—spoke about the state of the camp at the time of its 
opening: 
In the camp itself, there were eight barracks, only six of which we were allowed to occupy. We 
were the first prisoners who came there. The barracks had no heating, though it was already 
November. [...] On average, there surely were five people in two beds placed side by side, 
sometimes even four people per bed. We had no dayroom, no toilets, no water or water 
fountains or anything else. For the entire workforce, two so-called washhouses had been pre-
pared. They had two water fountains apiece. In this cold weather, this was quite a lot to ask 
of the prisoners. The toilets were the worst thing. There were approximately six side by side, 
                                       
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 72 (g), pp. 180–181; Czech: Kalendarium, p. 322; 
Setkiewicz: ―Ausgewählte Probleme,‖ pp. 46–47. 
69  Ervin Schulhof, affidavit, June 21, 1947, NI-7967. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 128–133, here p. 128. 
70  Czech: Kalendarium, pp. 326–327. 
71  Ibid., p. 328. 
72  Ibid., pp. 328ff.; Graphische Darstellung der Belegstärke des Nebenlagers Buna für den Zeit-
raum vom 1. Oktober bis zum 31. Dezember 1942, Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-
Birkenau, D-AuIII-3a. The chart is also found in the trial records of the criminal proceedings 
against Gerhard Maurer, head of Office D2 at the SS-WVHA and responsible for ―labor 
deployment issues regarding prisoners‖ as of May 1942, in the holdings of the Bundesarchiv 
Berlin, cf.. Maurer-Prozess, Vol. 12, pp. 298–302. BA Berlin, Bestandsergänzungsfilm Nr. 
42056. A duplicate copy of the document is also to be found at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
München, IfZ München, Fa 67. 
73  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 74/75 für die Zeit vom 19.10.–1.11.1942, Dü-1402, Archiv 
der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB 
XVII (g), p. 33. 
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and on the other side there were six more. The first half of these toilets were off limits to 
Jews, only Reichsdeutsche could use them. And that with a workforce of 900 Jewish men.74 
In January 1943, the camp‘s prisoner strength already had reached 3,750, and it 
increased at a rapid rate over the course of the year. In the northwestern part of 
the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, a separate work education camp run by 
the Katowice Gestapo Central Office was established on January 15, 1943.75 In 
five barracks surrounded by barbed wire, around 400 to 500 prisoners destined 
for ―work education‖ were incarcerated.76 Assigned to the camp for discipline and 
punishment were ―people who defaulted on employment contracts, refused to 
work, and were slackers.‖77 The SS guarded the Gestapo-run camp, which re-
mained in existence until the Buna/Monowitz camp was vacated in January 
1945.78 
In September 1943, 5,400 of the 6,500 inmates were deployed as workers for 
I.G. Auschwitz.79 In summer 1944, the camp‘s strength reached its height with 
more than 11,000 prisoners, as a result of the deportations of hundreds of thou-
sands of Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz-Birkenau, beginning in May 1944. The 
deportees selected by the SS at the ramp in Birkenau as ―fit for work‖ were, in 
part, transferred to the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.80 They were quar-
                                       
74  Josef Löwenstein, hearing of witness, December 4, 1952. Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Wiesbaden (=HHStAW), Abt. 460, Nr. 1424 (Wollheim gegen IG Farben), Vol. I, pp. 158R–
164R, here p. 158R. 
75  Letter from Oberregierungsrat Dr. Mildner (Gestapo – Staatspolizeileitstelle Kattowitz) to the 
Regierungspräsident in Kattowitz, January 11, 1943. Archiwum Państwowe Katowice, RK 
2910, p. 19.  
76  On this, see the biography of the camp elder of the Monowitz ―workers‘ educational camp‖: 
Siegfried Halbreich: Before—During—After. Surviving the Holocaust (Los Angeles: Schor, 
2000), p. 73. On the history and function of this camp in general, see: Gabriele Lotfi: KZ der 
Gestapo. Arbeitserziehungslager im Dritten Reich (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003). 
77  Communication from the Katowice Gestapo: Gestapo Kattowitz an Polizeipräsidenten, 
Polizeiämter und Landräte, Betr.: Arbeitserziehungslager Auschwitz der Staatspolizeileitstelle 
Kattowitz, January 11, 1943. Archiwum Państwowe Katowice, RK 2909, p. 4. 
78  Strzelecka / Setkiewicz: ―Der Bau,‖ pp. 150ff.  
79  I.G. Werk Auschwitz, 25. Baubesprechung in Auschwitz am 9. September 1943, September 
10, 1943, NI-11143. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, 
PDB 77 (g), pp. 123–138, here p. 129. 
80  The information is based on the account of the former head of the Welfare Department of I.G. 
Auschwitz, cf. Martin Rossbach, affidavit, January 21, 1948, NI-14287. Archiv des Fritz Bauer 
Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 93 (g), pp. 34–50, here p. 41; see also 
Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 333. 
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tered in two tents set up next to the barracks.81 On New Year‘s Day 1945, there 
were 10,350 prisoners in the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.82 
Composition of the Prisoner Groups in Monowitz 
The Buna external detachment, which began work in spring 1941, consisted pri-
marily of Polish prisoners; Jewish prisoners from France were added to it in the 
spring of 1942.83 In June 1942, as part of a major relocation initiative, non-
Jewish Polish prisoners were transported from Auschwitz to the concentration 
camps of the Altreich, and in return, Jewish prisoners were deported from the 
camps in the Altreich to Auschwitz.84 The result was an increase in the proportion 
of Jewish prisoners in the Buna external detachment. About 90 to 95 percent of 
the prisoners in Monowitz were Jews, who came from the German Reich, Austria, 
Poland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Greece, Hungary, Romania, 
Serbia, Italy, Luxembourg, and Czechoslovakia. Among the non-Jewish prison-
ers, the largest groups were Poles, Soviet citizens, and Reichsdeutsche. In addi-
tion, there were Sinti and Roma of unknown nationality, who constituted around 
1 to 2 percent of all prisoners in the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.85 In the 
summer of 1943, after successful attempts to escape, the SS transferred a large 
part of the Polish and Czech prisoners from Buna/Monowitz to the Buchenwald 
                                       
81  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 217. The architect Rudolf Dömming, who planned the concentration 
camp at the behest of I.G. Farben, spoke of two tents that were set up in the roll-call square 
in the summer of 1943. One tent had a capacity of 250 ―beds,‖ and the other had an addi-
tional 500, cf. Rudolf Dömming, affidavit, January 17, 1948, Dü-102. Archiv der Stiftung für 
Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB I (g), pp. 74–
80, here p. 78, and Rudolf Dömming, affidavit, January 20, 1948, Dü-435. Archiv der Stiftung 
für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB I (g), pp. 
90–91. Also see August Mayer, affidavit, June 25, 1947, NI-9815, p. 2. Archiv der Stiftung für 
Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokument NI-Serie. Dömming admitted after 1945 that 
this was ―an emergency solution, which was irresponsible both from a fire-protection stand-
point and from a human standpoint.‖ He was aware that for the inmates of these two tents, 
only ―2 washroom barracks were available, in which 100 men could wash at the same time‖ 
(Rudolf Dömming, affidavit, August 28, 1947, NI-10930, p. 5. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozial-
geschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokument NI-Serie). 
82  Übersicht über die Konzentrationslager unter Angabe der Belegungsstärke mit SS-Wachmann-
schaften und Häftlingen am 1.1. und 15.1.1945. Bundesarchiv Berlin, NS 3/439, p. 1. 
83  Wieslaw Kielar: Anus Mundi: 1,500 Days in Auschwitz/Birkenau (New York: Times Book, 
1980), pp. 87ff. 
84  Excerpt from: Wochenbericht Nr. 58/59 für die Zeit vom 29.5. bis 12.7.1942, gez. Faust, NI-
14515, pp. 1–2. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokument NI-
Serie. 
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and Sachsenhausen concentration camps within Altreich territory.86 As a conse-
quence of the great mass deportations of Hungarian Jews, their percentage share 
increased sharply between spring and summer 1944. The Buna/Monowitz camp 
contained male inmates almost exclusively. The exception was a small group of 
some 10 to 20 women forced into prostitution, who were housed by no later than 
summer 1944, possibly even by late 1943, in a brothel block. This block, sur-
rounded by a fence of its own, was located between Blocks 29 and 30.87 The 
functionary jobs inside the camp as block elders, prisoners on barracks-room 
duty, block and camp clerks, prisoner-physicians and prisoner-nurses, or outside 
the camp as Kapos of work detachments, were held principally by prisoners from 
the Reich, Austria, and Poland. The decisive factor in the manning of the functio-
nary positions, in addition to political and personal connections, frequently was 
the ability to understand the orders of the SS, which were issued in German. 
The Commandant of Buna/Monowitz 
After its opening in October 1942, the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp was 
initially subordinated to the commandant‘s office in the main camp. After an in-
dependent administrative unit was set up in November 1943, SS-
Hauptsturmführer Heinrich Schwarz became the first camp commandant.88 He 
held this position until the pull-out from the concentration camp on January 18, 
1945. Schwarz was born in Munich on June 14, 1906, the son of Marie Schwarz 
and Heinrich Schwarz, an electrician. In 1919, as a youth, he joined the 
Freikorps Epp, which took part in the crushing of the Bavarian Soviet Republic 
(Räterepublik) in Munich. Schwarz served as the civilian orderly of the Ober-
kommando Möhl, quartered in the Hotel Continental. After completing his train-
ing as a reproduction photographer, Schwarz worked intermittently in this field. 
                                       
85  Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe 
Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Zespół Oświadczenia, t. 6, Syg. Osw/Posener/14, pp. 824–882, 
here p. 829; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 105.  
86  Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt Posener, p. 869. 
87  Ibid., p. 826; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 101, p. 221; Piotr Setkiewicz: ―Häftlingsarbeit im KZ 
Auschwitz-III-Monowitz. Die Frage nach der Wirtschaftlichkeit der Arbeit.‖ In: Ulrich Herbert / 
Karin Orth / Christoph Dieckmann, eds.: Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Ent-
wicklung und Struktur (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998), Vol. II, pp. 584–605; Setkiewicz dates 
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In the years 1926–1931, he was unemployed. In late 1931, he joined the SS 
(No. 19,691) and the NSDAP (No. 786,871). He carried out his duty in the SS 
unit Stamm 2/I Casella and became deputy guard commander in the security 
service of the NSDAP party headquarters in the ―Brown House‖ in Munich. After 
the transfer of power to the Nazis, Schwarz was assigned to a guard detail of the 
police authority in Munich on March 9, 1933. After June 7, 1933, he was 
deployed under the command of Reinhard Heydrich in the surveillance of the 
switchboard of the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten by the Political Police. In De-
cember 1933, Schwarz was working as a reproduction photographer once again. 
On August 15, 1935, he married Amalie Gascher. Within the SS, he rose to the 
rank of SS-Unterscharführer in 1937 and was promoted to SS-Obersturmführer 
in 1939, and to SS-Hauptscharführer four years later.  Schwarz began his career 
in the camp system of the SS one week after the invasion of Poland, starting in 
the Dachau concentration camp on September 7, 1939. On September 27, 1939, 
Schwarz was assigned to the Mauthausen concentration camp. In June 1941, he 
was transferred to the SS Main Office for Budget and Construction and on Sep-
tember 30, 1941, he switched to the Concentration Camps Inspectorate in 
Oranienburg, for which he worked at Field Office I/5 (Prisoner Deployment) in 
Auschwitz and occasionally in Birkenau. In mid-August 1943, the camp comman-
dant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss, appointed him to act as deputy during his ab-
sence.89 On November 10, 1943, Schwarz switched to the newly created office 
―KL Auschwitz III,‖ which was in charge of both the Buna/Monowitz concentration 
camp and the subcamps. Twelve days later, he advanced to the position of camp 
commandant of Auschwitz III.90 Schwarz‘s adjutant from June 1, 1944, to Janu-
ary 18, 1945, was SS-Untersturmführer Rudolf Orlich.91 After the Buna/Monowitz 
concentration camp was vacated in January 1945, Schwarz became camp com-
mandant of the Natzweiler-Struthof (Alsace) concentration camp on February 1, 
                                       
88  Der SS-Standortälteste, Standortbefehl 53/43, gez. Liebehenschel, November 22, 1943. In: 
Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 367. 
89  Kommandantur des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz, Standortsonderbefehl vom 18.8.1943, 
gez. Höss. In: Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 326. 
90  Der SS-Standortälteste, Standortbefehl 53/43, gez. Liebehenschel, November 22, 1943. In: 
Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, S. 367. 
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1945.92 For the crimes he committed in the Natzweiler concentration camp, 
Schwarz was sentenced to death by a French military tribunal in Rastatt and ex-
ecuted near Sandweiher on March 20, 1947.93 
The Administrative Structure of the Camp  
The order issued by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler on November 22, 1943, 
was of fundamental importance. It subdivided the Auschwitz concentration camp 
into three administrative units: Auschwitz I (main camp), Auschwitz II (Birke-
nau), and Auschwitz III (Monowitz and subcamps). Apart from the subcamps 
with agricultural breeding and production operations, which were administered 
by the commandant‘s office of Auschwitz II-Birkenau, Himmler thus subordinated 
all the subcamps at industrial plants to the SS camp commandant‘s office in Mo-
nowitz.94 In December 1943, the name of the camp, initially ―Lager Buna‖ (Buna 
Camp) was changed to ―Arbeitslager Monowitz‖ (Monowitz Labor Camp).95 Only a 
few weeks before the pull-out, however, the administrative responsibilities were 
rearranged again. On November 25, 1944, the commandant of Auschwitz issued 
a garrison order calling for administrative reassignment of the Birkenau extermi-
nation camp (Auschwitz II) to the main camp once again, while the Monowitz 
camp now was to be named ―Konzentrationslager Monowitz‖ (Monowitz Concen-
tration Camp) and made independent.96 
The internal organizational structure of the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp 
was modified over the course of time, depending on the setup of the camp, and 
corresponded to the administrative breakdown of the German concentration 
camps into five departments, an arrangement that had evolved after 1933. The 
                                       
―Die Organisationsstruktur des KL Auschwitz.‖ In: Długoborski / Piper, eds.: Auschwitz 1940–
1945, Vol. I, pp. 165–320, here p. 186. 
92  Data based on: Bundesarchiv Berlin, BDC-Personalakten Heinrich Schwarz, geb. 14.6.1906 in 
München (Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) und SS-Offiziersakte (SSO)). In 1947, after 
his arrest, he was sentenced to death by a French military tribunal in Rastatt and executed, 
cf. Staatliches Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau, ed.: Auschwitz in den Augen der SS. Rudolf Höß, 
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93  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 80, p. 109; Ernst Klee: Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer 
war was vor und nach 1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003), p. 572. 
94  Der SS-Standortälteste, Standortbefehl 53/43, gez. Liebehenschel, November 22, 1943. In: 
Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, pp. 366ff. 
95  Der SS-Standortälteste, Standortbefehl 54/43, gez. Liebehenschel, December 1, 1943. In: 
Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 370. 
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commandant‘s office (Department I) was in charge of all the subcamps of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. The Political Department (II) in Monowitz existed 
at first only as an Auschwitz concentration camp outpost, created by SS-Haupt-
scharführer Meister.97 He soon was succeeded by SS-Unterscharführer Ernst 
Hofmann.98 Other members of the SS who functioned there were SS-
Unterscharführer Josef Hofer and SS-Oberscharführer Josef Erber-Houstek, who 
was transferred to Birkenau and replaced by SS-Oberscharführer Josef 
Wieczorek. Under the leadership of SS-Oberscharführer Johann Taute, the Politi-
cal Department was expanded to become a branch.99 The Political Department 
consisted of an intake and release office as well as a unit for registry, organiza-
tion, and file and card-index management. In close coordination with the 
Gestapo, the Political Department initiated search procedures after attempted 
escapes and countered organized resistance in the camp by conducting investi-
gations and interrogations, which included brutal mistreatment and systematic 
torture of the prisoners. In contrast to the Auschwitz I main camp, no photo-
graphic identification unit (Erkennungsdienst) was set up in the Buna/Monowitz 
concentration camp.100 The Protective Custody Camp Management Department 
(III, Schutzhaftlagerführung) in Monowitz, under the leadership of SS-
Obersturmführer Vinzenz Schöttl, however, was independent.101 In November 
1943, the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, like Birkenau, was assigned an 
independent department for ―work deployment‖ (IIIa, Arbeitseinsatz), headed by 
SS-Oberscharführer Richard Stolten, who was replaced in this function by SS-
Unterscharführer Rudolf Wilhelm Buchholz on September 1, 1944.102 Appointed 
                                       
96  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 110; cf. Standortbefehl 29/44, November 25, 1944. In: Frei et al., 
eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, pp. 514–516, here p. 514. 
97  Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe 
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98  Lasik: ―Organisationsstruktur,‖ p. 212, fn. 85. 
99  Lasik: ―Organisationsstruktur,‖ p. 217; Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt 
Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Zespół Oświadczenia, t. 
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December 2, 1943. In: Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 374f.; Lasik: 
―Organisationsstruktur,‖ p. 241. 
102  Lasik: ―Organisationsstruktur,‖ p. 255; Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt 
Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Zespół Oświadczenia, t. 
6, Syg. Osw/Posener/14, pp. 824–882, here p. 840; Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 107, adopts 
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as work detachment supervisor of the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp was 
SS-Hauptscharführer Bernhard Rakers, who had been transferred from Sachsen-
hausen for disciplinary reasons and was greatly feared because of his brutal ill-
treatment of prisoners.103 Department IV, responsible for food, clothing, housing, 
and financial affairs, set up branches in Auschwitz-III-Monowitz for certain func-
tions, such as food warehouses and a camp kitchen.104 Subdivisions of this 
department, however, such as the prisoners‘ property management office 
(Gefangenen-Eigentums-Verwaltung) and the prisoners‘ money management 
office (Häftlings-Geld-Verwaltung), had no branches in Auschwitz III.105 Depart-
ment V, the chief garrison physician‘s office (SS-Standortarzt) obtained an inde-
pendent  structure in Auschwitz III concentration camp as a result of the 
appointment of a managing physician, who also supervised all the subcamps 
from his headquarters.106 In the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp itself, there 
was a prisoner infirmary, where the following SS camp physicians served in turn: 
From October 1942 to December 1942, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Bruno Kitt; from 
December 1942 to January 1943 or March 1943, SS-Hauptsturmführer Dr. 
Hellmuth Vetter; from March 1943 to October 20, 1943, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. 
Friedrich Entress.107 They were followed by, from October 1943 to November 
1943, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Werner Rohde; from November 1943 to Septem-
ber 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Dr. Horst Fischer;108 and finally, from September 
1944 to January 1945, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Hans Wilhelm König.109 The SS 
medical orderlies who reported to the camp physician in the Buna/Monowitz con-
centration camp also rotated frequently: From October 1942 to December 1942, 
the orderly was SS-Oberscharführer Franz Wloka, who was replaced from Janu-
                                       
the first name for Stolten erroneously given by Posener and thus refers to him as Wilhelm, 
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103 Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 198. On Bernhard Rakers, see also the biographical article at 
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105  Ibid., p. 271. 
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108  Information based on Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 165. 
109  Ibid., p. 165. 
www.wollheim-memorial.de Florian Schmaltz: The Buna/Monowitz Concentration Camp, p. 24 
  
 
ary 1943 to July 1943 by SS-Unterscharführer Kock and then, in turn, by the 
following: from February 1943 to March 1943, SS-Rottenführer Joseph 
Schmucker; from February 1943 to March 1943, SS-Oberscharführer Egon Bruno 
Grosse; from August 1943 to September 1943, SS-Rottenführer Alexander 
Godwinski; from April 1944 to June 1944, SS-Unterscharführer Emil Hantl; and 
in the final two years, from January 1943 to January 1945, SS-Unterscharführer 
Gerhard Neubert.110 The incompleteness of the available documentation makes it 
impossible to know with certainty  whether the Buna/Monowitz camp also had a 
branch of Department VI, Welfare, Training, and Special Services, which was re-
sponsible for the cultural support and entertainment of the SS troops.111 
Guard Forces  
The guard force of the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, which was erected in 
October 1942, was recruited from the ―Buna guard battalion,‖ which had been in 
existence since April 1941. From June 1942 to May 1943, SS-Untersturmführer 
Otto Ludwig Schulz functioned as its company leader, and in November 1942 he 
was temporarily represented by SS-Obersturmführer Max Otto Ehser. His succes-
sors were, from May 1943 to October 1943, SS-Obersturmführer Hans Karl 
Möser and, from November 1944 to January 1945, SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto 
Broßmann.112 The camp commandant‘s garrison order of November 22, 1943, 
placed the ―Buna Guard Company‖ and the 5th Guard Company under the camp 
commandant of Auschwitz III, Heinrich Schwarz.113 On May 28, 1944, by special 
order of the office of the Buna/Monowitz camp commandant Heinrich Schwarz, 
the SS-Totenkopfsturmbataillon KL Auschwitz III (Auschwitz III Concentration 
Camp SS Death‘s-Head Assault Battalion), which consisted of seven companies, 
                                       
110  Makowski: ―Organisation,‖ p. 129f. On Gerhard Neubert, see also the biographical article at 
http://www.wollheim-memorial.de/en/gerhard_neubert_19091993. 
111  Lasik: ―Organisationsstruktur,‖ pp. 297ff. 
112  Aleksander Lasik: ―Die SS-Besatzung des KL Auschwitz.‖ In: Długoborski / Piper, eds.: Ausch-
witz 1940–1945, Vol. I, pp. 321–384, here p. 353. 
113  Der SS-Standortälteste, Standortbefehl 53/43, gez. Liebehenschel, November 22, 1943. In: 
Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 366; and Kommandantur 
Konzentrationslager Auschwitz III – Kommandanturbefehl 1/43, gez. Schwarz, December 2, 
1943. In: Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 374f. 
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was formed.114 The 1st Company, under company commander SS-
Obersturmführer Paul Heinrich Theodor Müller, was given the duty of guarding 
the camp. The remaining six companies, as well as the 8th Company, which was 
formed later, guarded the subcamps that were subordinated to the Auschwitz-
III-Monowitz concentration camp.115 
The Work Deployment of the Prisoners 
The prisoners served as a labor force for the SS and commercial enterprises both 
inside and outside the camp. In the camp, the SS used prisoners to maintain the 
camp organization. The camp Kapo was in charge of a small camp detachment, 
which was given jobs requiring skilled manual work, as well as other assign-
ments. Around 20 to 30 prisoners worked in the infirmary as physicians and 
nurses. In each block, there were a block elder, two men on barracks duty who 
were responsible for cleanliness, and a block clerk, who was responsible for re-
porting on the occupancy of the block at roll-calls and for making the food-ration 
and death reports. In addition, there were various detachments of skilled work-
ers (carpenters, glaziers, shoemakers, and tailors), each of which consisted of 
around 20 to 30 men. Some 40 prisoners worked in the camp kitchen, allocated 
to the potato-peeling kitchen, the prisoner kitchen, and the SS kitchen. Directly 
reporting to the SS were another 4 to 5 prisoners who had to work as general 
handymen for the SS, and 3 more who worked in the Political Department.116 Ap-
proximately 10 prisoners, including Paul Kozwara, Gustav Herzog, and Stefan 
Lembke, were assigned to the camp office.117 It is not known how many prison-
ers were forced to play in the Buna/Monowitz camp orchestra, beginning in 
summer 1943, while the work detachments marched out of camp and back into it 
each day.118 Outside of the camp, thousands of prisoners were compelled to work 
for private firms at the plant construction site. For the most part, the slave la-
                                       
114  Frei et al., eds.: Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle, p. 452f.; Lasik: ―SS-Besatzung,‖ p. 
354, erroneously dates the order on May 27, 1944. 
115  Lasik: ―SS-Besatzung,‖ p. 355. 
116  They reported to the camp elder, Josef Windeck, cf. Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by 
Curt Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Zespół 
Oświadczenia, t. 6, Syg. Osw/Posener/14, pp. 824–882, here p. 830. 
117  Ibid., p. 830. 
118  Ibid., p. 877. 
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borers hired out by the SS to I.G. Farben worked directly for the chemical con-
cern, but thousands also were further hired out to subcontractors that were 
fulfilling construction contracts for I.G. Auschwitz. Exploitation of the prisoners 
was profitable for I.G. Farben. The daily rate payable to the SS for prisoner labor 
was about one-third lower than the prevailing regional wage for free labor in 
Upper Silesia. In addition, by exploiting concentration camp prisoners, the firm 
avoided substantial expenditures for housing, severance pay, sick pay, social 
welfare, or cultural activities, etc., which accounted for about 25 percent of the 
labor costs for free laborers. That more than compensated for the lower produc-
tivity of the emaciated concentration camp prisoners, in comparison with free 
laborers.119 
The transportation and earth-moving detachments in particular, viewed by the 
prisoners as death squads, were usually large work detachments, whose mem-
bers were continually driven to perform at higher speeds by brutal beatings. This 
category included the life-threatening cement detachments (Detachments 1 and 
4). In Detachment 4, more than 100 prisoners, moving at a quick pace, had to 
haul 50-kilogram sacks of cement.120 In the concrete detachment (Detach-
ment 8), prisoners had to build bunkers 15 to 30 meters below ground to serve 
as air-raid shelters. In 1944, the construction managers of I.G. Auschwitz did not 
hesitate to make 35 Jewish children from Hungary between the ages of 8 and 12 
do heavy labor in this death squad, urging them with kicks and slaps in the face 
to work at a faster pace.121 Numerous inmates also fell victim to the infamous 
cable-laying detachment, whose contingent of 200 prisoners made it one of the 
largest squads: frequently, several prisoners died in a single day in accidents or 
from whippings.122 In Detachment 19, which was deployed at the lumberyard, 
                                       
119  Setkiewicz: ―Häftlingsarbeit,‖ p. 589f. 
120  Rudolf Vitek, affidavit, March 3, 1947, NI-4830. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 61–69, here p. 62. On Detachment 4 (cement), cf. 
Josef Löwenstein, hearing of witness, December 4, 1952. HHStAW, Abt. 460, Nr. 1424 (Woll-
heim gegen IG Farben), Vol. I, pp. 158R–164R, as well as Jozef Jakubik, affidavit, May 23, 
1947, NI-9818. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 73 
(g), pp. 137–146, here p. 142f.; Norbert Wollheim, affidavit, June 3, 1947, NI-9807. Archiv 
des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 122–130, here 
p. 122. 
121  Marcel Stourdzé, hearing of witness, January 15, 1953. HHStAW, Abt. 460, Nr. 1424 (Woll-
heim gegen IG Farben), Vol. II, pp. 213–217R, here p. 214.  
122  Tibor Wohl: Arbeit macht tot. Eine Jugend in Auschwitz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990), 
pp. 48ff., and the statement of Karl Wagner, a metal worker employed at I.G. Auschwitz: Karl 
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prisoners had to unload logs, some of which measured 16 meters long and 30 
centimeters around, from rail cars while being beaten and clubbed by German 
master craftsmen.123 The chances of survival were greater, however, in the 
electricians‘ detachment, in which 120 to 180 Jewish prisoners worked on build-
ing electrical facilities.124 During the course of 1943, the percentage of prisoners 
deployed in assembly detachments increased. As the construction progressed, 
the focal points of the work changed, which led to a growing share of prisoners 
who were deployed as skilled workers. They took on jobs as metal workers, ma-
sons,125 carpenters,126 painters,127 or welders.128 Finally, starting in 1944, there 
was an increase in the percentage of production detachments, in which prisoners 
did highly skilled work even in chemical labs, as in the case of Primo Levi in De-
tachment 98.129 In the clerical detachments, prisoners even handled correspon-
dence and processed statistical tables.130 However, prisoners also were preferred 
for risky, life-endangering jobs, such as working in the bomb-clearing detach-
ment, which had to retrieve unexploded shells on the plant grounds after the air-
raids in 1944.131 
                                       
Wagner, affidavit, September 3, 1947, NI-11051, p. 1f. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialge-
schichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
123  Arnest Tauber, affidavit, May 3, 1947, NI-4829. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 147–149, here p. 148; Salomon Kohn, affidavit, 
May 29, 1947, NI-10824. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall 
VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 110–115, here p. 113. 
124  Kurt Rödiger, affidavit, August 26, 1947, Dü-449. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte 
Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB IV (g), pp. 68–77, here p. 68.  
125  In Detachment 30, cf. Anton Ottowitz, affidavit, March 6, 1947, Dü-1253, p. 3. Archiv der 
Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Dürrfeld DDB XIV 
(g), pp. 121–124, here p. 123.  
126  In Detachment 43, cf. Isaac Spetter, affidavit, November 13, 1947, NI-12383. Archiv des Fritz 
Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 N (d), pp. 1–8, here p. 3. 
127  Adam König, examination by judge (Kreisgericht Leipzig), February 2, 1963, LG Frankfurt am 
Main, 4 Ks 2/63. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-1, HA-82, pp. 15698–15699R, and 
examination by judge (Bezirksgericht Leipzig), July 1, 1963, LG Frankfurt am Main, 4 Ks 2/63. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-1, HA-86, pp. 16637–16637R. 
128  Wohl: Arbeit macht tot, p. 80.  
129  Primo Levi: Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996), see the chapters ―Chemical Examination,‖ pp. 101ff., and ―Die drei Leute 
vom Labor,‖ pp. 136ff. 
130  Curt Posener, affidavit, June 3, 1947, NI-9808, p. 1. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte 
Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
131  Arnest Tauber, affidavit, May 3, 1947, NI-4829. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 147–149, here p. 148; Salomon Kohn, affidavit, 
May 29, 1947, NI-10824. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall 
VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 110–115, here pp. 114–115. 




Estimates of the number of dead at I.G. Auschwitz vary considerably. A principal 
reason for this divergence is the systematic destruction of files that took place 
shortly before the war ended. Systematically and on a large scale, both the SS 
and I.G. Farben employees destroyed huge quantities of secret documents in the 
final months of the war in an effort to conceal the crimes committed in Auschwitz 
and impede the Allies‘ investigation and prosecution of the offenders.132 Historical 
reconstruction of the number of deaths is complicated, because the prisoner card 
index and the ―death books‖ for the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp survived 
only in fragmentary form. In the research literature, therefore, information on 
the number of prisoners murdered at the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp are 
based mostly on estimates made by former inmates. These estimates range from 
a minimum of 23,000 to a maximum of 40,000 dead.133 The Polish historian Piotr 
                                       
132  On the dispute between employees of I.G. Farbenindustrie and the American investigators 
concerning the destruction of I.G. Auschwitz files by I.G. Farben employee Wolfgang Alt after 
the war ended, see the bulky bundle of papers in: Document No. 330, Official Court File, Vol. 
49, pp. 1440–1520. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, reel 
109, Official Court File, Vol. 49, pp. 154–235. 
133  The figure of 120,000 dead given by Gustav Herzog, the former head of the office that kept 
the prisoner card files, seems greatly exaggerated, cf. Gustav Herzog, affidavit, October 21, 
1947, NI-12069. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 
79 (g), pp. 44–53. Under examination in the I.G. Farben Trial at Nuremberg, Herzog amended 
the figure to 60,000 prisoners who passed through the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp. 
He corrected himself, saying that the figure of 120,000 prisoners referred to the total number 
of all prisoners in the Auschwitz concentration and extermination camp, cf. Gustav Herzog, 
hearing of witness, November 12, 1947. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfol-
geprozess Fall VI, Protocol of the Main Trial (= Prot.) (e), reel 005, Vol. 11, pp. 3621–3639, 
here p. 3624, and, respectively, Prot. (g), reel 050, Vol. 11a, pp. 3643–3661, here p. 3646. 
Herzog‘s figure of 60,000 for the number of prisoners who passed through the Buna/Monowitz 
concentration camp also seems too high. According to Ervin Schulhof, a former clerk in the 
Work Deployment Department, between October 1942 and January 1945 around 35,000 
passed through the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, cf. Ervin Schulhof, affidavit, June 21, 
1947, NI-7967. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 
(g), pp. 128–133, here p. 130. The former prisoner-physician Stefan Budziaszek (Stefan 
Buthner) puts the number of dead at 23,000, cf. Stefan Budziaszek, affidavit, October 27, 
1947, NI-12070. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 
79 (g), pp. 54–64, here p. 61. Moses Zlotolow, on the basis of unspecified reports, speaks of 
approximately 40,000 dead, cf. Moses Zlotolow, affidavit, September 2, 1947, NI-11081. Ar-
chiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 204–205. 
Hayes: Industry and Ideology, p. 359, bases his figure of around 23,000 dead on the esti-
mates of Schulhof and Budziaszek. Raul Hilberg, also with reference to Schulhof, accepts that 
35,000 prisoners passed through the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, of whom at least 
25,000 died, cf. Raul Hilberg: Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1990), p. 994. Karl Heinz Roth, taking the available sources as a basis, proceeds on 
the assumption that ―around 30,000‖ prisoners were murdered, cf. Roth: ―I.G. Auschwitz,‖ p. 
87. With reference to I.G. Auschwitz and the associated coal mines, Bernd C. Wagner also 
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Setkiewicz, however, using surviving original sources as a basis, thinks a death 
toll of at least 10,000 is plausible.134 
On the other hand, Bernd C. Wagner, in his work on the history of the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, states that a death toll of ―30,000 prisoners 
in all who died as a direct result of work for the IG is not too high,‖ and of these 
victims, ―around 25,000 men lost their lives while working in the Buna plants, in 
the Monowitz camp, in the prisoner infirmary, or as a result of selections.‖135 
Here he relies, on the one hand, on the statements of the former prisoners 
Schulhof (25,000)136 and Buthner (23,000).137 Former inmate Ludwig Hess, who 
was present during the questioning of the previous plant manager of I.G. Ausch-
witz, Walther Dürrfeld, testified that the statistics kept in the camp office covered 
―about 30,000 people‖ and that ―20,000 people were used up,‖ for a final tally of 
10,000 to 11,000 prisoners.138 Dr. Horst Fischer, the SS physician responsible for 
the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, estimated 20 years after the events that 
during his time at Buna/Monowitz alone, from spring 1943 to fall 1944, 10,000 
prisoners died in the camp.139 The estimates of the surviving prisoners, according 
                                       
finds the figure of ―a total of 30,000 prisoners who died as a direct result of working for the IG 
not overstated.‖ (Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 282). 
134  Piotr Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów IG Farben Werk Auschwitz 1941–1945 (Oświęcim: 
Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, 2006), pp. 156–158, p. 163. For her help with 
translation from Polish, I am grateful to Anna Słobodzianek. See also: Piotr Setkiewicz: ―Mor-
tality among the Prisoners in Auschwitz III-Monowitz.‖ In: Pro Memoria. Information Bulletin 
26 (2007), pp. 61–66. 
135  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, pp. 280–282. 
136  Ervin Schulhof, affidavit, June 21, 1947, NI-7967. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 128–133, here p. 130. 
137  Stefan Budziaszek, affidavit, October 27, 1947, NI-12070. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 79 (g), pp. 54–64, here p. 61. 
138  Wagner erroneously attributes this statement by Ludwig Hess to the former plant manager of 
I.G. Auschwitz, Walther Dürrfeld, when he claims that ―in statements by former employees of 
IG Auschwitz, there is mention of similar figures‖ (Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 281, fn. 360). 
The transcripts of the examination, however, make it clear that it was not Dürrfeld but Hess 
who asked questions of his own in the interrogation and commented on Dürrfeld‘s statements, 
mentioning the estimate of 20,000 dead. Cf. Interrogation No. 743. Examination of Dr. 
Walther Dürrfeld by Mr. Benvenuto von Halle, in the presence of attorney Moses L. Kove 
(Economies Section Sprecher Trial Team) and Ludwig Hess (former inmate of Monowitz) and 
stenographer Lotte Kluge on February 24, 1947, NI-11046, pp. 1–74, here p. 65. Archiv der 
Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. This also applies to 
another statement cited by Wagner, that of Christian Schneider, a former I.G. Farben board 
member. The figure of 30,000 dead mentioned in the examination comes from Benvenuto von 
Halle, the American interrogator, not from Schneider, who comments when confronted with 
this. See Interrogation No. 888c. Examination of Christian Schneider on March 27, 1947, by 
Arthur T. Cooper and Benvenuto von Halle, April 17, 1947, NI-11686, pp. 1–117, here p. 93. 
Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
139  Rogatory commission hearing of Horst Fischer, StA Frankfurt am Main, 4 Js 798/64 
(preliminary investigation of Ontl et al.), p. 1425. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts. 
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to Wagner, were ―also supported by comparison with the available information 
on the life expectancy and selections of prisoners in Monowitz.‖ For 1943, he 
proceeds on the assumption ―of an average of 3,000 prisoner laborers, for 1944, 
7,000.‖ After ―subtraction of citizens of the German Reich and other non-Jewish 
prisoners, who had considerably better living conditions, and of the prisoner 
functionaries as well,‖ he estimates that ―around 80 percent, that is, 2,400 and 
5,600 respectively, belong to the category of ‗ordinary‘ prisoners,‖ who were 
―exposed to the most intense pressure of the extermination machinery.‖ From 
the fact that the testimonies of former witnesses unanimously ―assumed an av-
erage life expectancy of three to four months,‖ Wagner concludes that ―the num-
ber of ‗ordinary‘ prisoners was ‗winnowed‘ roughly three times per year by 
means of death or selection.‖ This, he says, results ―in a figure of 7,200 for 1943 
and 16,800 for 1944, that is, altogether 24,000‖ prisoners who died at the con-
struction site of I.G. Auschwitz, which conforms ―with surprising accuracy to the 
information given in the witness reports.‖140 
Furthermore, he says, these data also are in agreement with the contemporary 
sources on the number of prisoners selected by SS doctors to be sent from the 
Buna/Monowitz prisoner infirmary to Birkenau for extermination or, in the initial 
phase, to the main camp. The surviving transfer lists of the Buna/Monowitz con-
centration camp for the period from November 1, 1942, to October 1944 contain 
a total of 7,293141 names or numbers of prisoners who were transferred to Birke-
nau or, in the initial phase, to the Auschwitz main camp. Wagner rightly empha-
sizes that the transfer lists do not include the camp selections, which in his 
estimate ―also must have claimed the lives of several thousand prisoners.‖142 
Further, ―the persons who died or were killed directly on the plant grounds also‖ 
must be added on; in the concentration camp‘s book of deaths, they are to be 
estimated at ―1,647, at least.‖143 Wagner views the ―assumption of a figure of 
                                       
140  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 281. 
141  Wagner gives the figure of 7,295, which deviates slightly from the source cited by him, proba-
bly because of a typing error. There, Herbert Ungar‘s estimate of 7,293 transfers appears, cf. 
Herbert Ungar, affidavit, May 19, 1948, NI-15299 and NI-14997. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Insti-
tuts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution Exhibit 2262, reel 035, pp. 1–318. 
142  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 282, fn. 362; cf. NI-14997. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, Prosecution Exhibit 2262, reel 035, pp. 5–318. 
143  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 281, fn. 363. In this regard, see the book of deaths kept by the 
Buna/Monowitz prisoner infirmary from November 16, 1942, to January 15, 1945, Archiwum 
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around 23,000 to 25,000 dead‖ in the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp as 
being confirmed by the surviving sources. Still to be added to this are the prison-
ers who died in the coal pits of I.G. Auschwitz at subcamps, whom Wagner esti-
mates at ―several thousand additional prisoners.‖ Therefore a death toll of 
―30,000 prisoners in all who died as a direct result of work for the IG,‖ according 
to Wagner, is ―not too high an estimate.‖144  
The Polish historian Piotr Setkiewicz puts the number of prisoners employed at 
I.G. Auschwitz during the entire construction phase at 20,000 men in total, mar-
kedly lower than the estimates long accepted by historical research.145 Opposed 
to that, however, is the statement of former prisoner Ervin Schulhof, whose task 
it was in the camp to administer the prisoner card index. According to his infor-
mation, recorded in an affidavit after the liberation, the total number of 
Buna/Monowitz prisoner files maintained by him in the camp‘s office was around 
35,000.146 In keeping with the lower overall number of prisoners in the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp, Setkiewicz also puts the number of dead at 
a minimum of 10,000 prisoners, substantially lower than assumed by the pre-
vious research. In his calculations, Setkiewicz relies solely on surviving sources, 
rather than on statements by survivors.147 A central source for his line of reason-
ing is a curve and bar chart that contains figures for the Buna/Monowitz prisoner 
population for the period from November 1, 1942, to December 31, 1944. The 
document, found in a latrine on the camp grounds in 1947, after the war was 
over, uses variable scaling to record the size of the camp population, the number 
of prisoners away from work because of sickness, the number of prisoners 
treated in the prisoner infirmary on an out-patient basis, the number of transfers 
from the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp to the main camp or to Birkenau, 
                                       
Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, D-AuIII-5/4, excerpts in: NI-15295. Archiv der 
Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
144  Wagner: IG Auschwitz, pp. 281–282. The prisoners in the Buna external detachment, who 
also were exploited for I.G. Auschwitz, are not taken into consideration in Wagner‘s 
calculation. 
145  Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów, p. 167. 
146  Ervin Schulhof, affidavit, June 21, 1947, NI-7967. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 74 (g), pp. 128–133, here p. 130. 
147  Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów, p. 156, p. 163, and Setkiewicz: ―Mortality among the Prison-
ers.‖ 
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and the number of dead recorded in the camp and in the prisoner infirmary.148 
Robert Waitz, a former prisoner-physician in the Buna/Monowitz concentration 
camp, who was associated with the medical school of the Université Strasbourg 
before and after his imprisonment, stated in 1976 that the graph had been pre-
pared by two political prisoners, Felix Rausch and Stefan Heymann, in the office 
of the sick bay in the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.149 The place of its dis-
covery and the information provided by Waitz suggest that the source was a 
chart put together by prisoners as an act of resistance, to document the number 
of dead and thus the dimensions of the crimes perpetrated in the Buna/Monowitz 
concentration camp. 
According to Setkiewicz‘s calculations, some 7,200 to 7,300 prisoners were 
transferred from Buna/Monowitz to Auschwitz-Birkenau and to the Auschwitz 
main camp, of whom at most 20 percent survived.150 An additional 1,670 dead, 
as Setkiewicz emphasizes, are documented by the book of deaths for the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.151 He gives an estimate of 800 to 1,000 
dead for prisoners who were selected in places other than the prisoner infirmary 
and killed. In addition, there were at least three large selections in early and late 
January 1943 and at the end of September 1944, whose death tolls Setkiewicz 
calculates on the basis of the graph from the prisoner infirmary. Accordingly, an 
initial large selection of 1,200 prisoners took place on January 3 or 4, 1943; 
around 200 of these men were from the prisoner infirmary. In a second selection 
on January 31 or February 1, 1943, 1,000 more prisoners, including around 150 
from the prisoner infirmary, were seized and transferred to Auschwitz-Birkenau 
to be gassed. The third selection took place on September 25 or 26, 1944, and at 
this time around 600 prisoners, including 214 from the prisoner infirmary, were 
selected.152 
                                       
148  Graph of the prisoner strength of the Buna auxiliary camp for the period from October 1 to 
December 31, 1942. Archiwum Państwowe Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, D-Au III-3a 
(Monowitz). 
149  Robert Waitz: ―Le graphique de l'infirmerie du camp de Buna-Monowitz (Auschwitz III).‖ In: 
Benoist Ady-Brille / Pierre Paraf, eds.: Les techniciens de la mort (Paris: Fédération Nationale 
des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes, 1976), pp. 222–225. 
150  Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów, p. 156 and p. 163. Thus Setkiewicz revises downward by seve-
ral hundred the estimates of about 8,000 transfers given by former prisoner Antoni Makowski, 
cf. Makowski: ―Organisation.‖ 
151  Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów, p. 153. 
152  Setkiewicz: Zdziejów obozów, p. 158. 
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The estimates of 25,000 to 30,000 dead in the Buna/Monowitz concentration 
camp, recorded after the war in the affidavits of surviving prisoner functionaries, 
and the data from the surviving residual sources remain contradictory. However, 
the precisely documented chart kept over an extended period of time by Felix 
Rausch and Stefan Heymann, recording the prisoner strength, transfers, and 
deaths in the camp, speaks in favor of the lower estimates made by Setkiewicz, 
who assumes a death toll of at least 10,000 for the Buna/Monowitz concentration 
camp. These secretly recorded statistics, however, document only the selections 
conducted by the SS in the prisoner infirmary. They did not include selections 
conducted in the camp in places other than the prisoner infirmary, which remain 
an instability factor because they are only incompletely documented in other 
sources that have survived. For these reasons, the number calculated by 
Setkiewicz—10,000 deaths at the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp—is to be 
regarded as absolutely the lowest minimum estimate. More research, using all 
available sources, is required in order to gain a more precise picture of the death 
tolls at the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp and at the three subcamps with 
the coal pits belonging to I.G. Farben (Fürstengrube, Janinagrube, and Günther-
grube), which were part of the Auschwitz III subcamp system. 
At the I.G. Auschwitz plant construction site, many prisoners died in accidents at 
work, often caused by lack of occupational safety measures. The most common 
causes of death, however, were physical emaciation due to the boundless ex-
ploitation of the workforce, chronic hunger, and untreated illnesses. When their 
performance declined or they became unable to work because of prolonged ill-
ness or disability, the prisoners—at the instigation of I.G. Farben employees—
were transferred to Birkenau in regularly held selections; the vast majority were 
gassed there. The selections took place at the camp gate when the prisoners 
marched out in the morning, in the prisoner infirmary, and in the roll-call square, 
the Appellplatz.153 According to a former prisoner-physician, among the partici-
pants in the selections at the camp gate were ―always several civilians who be-
longed to the I.G. Farben task force,‖154 in addition to the camp commandant, 
the head of the protective custody camp, the SS official responsible for the allo-
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cation of labor, and the SS camp doctor. This practice was sanctioned by SS-
Obersturmbannführer Gerhard Maurer, head of Amtsgruppe D II (labor 
allocation) of the SS-WVHA, who had traveled to Auschwitz for negotiations re-
garding an increase in the deployment of prisoner labor, on February 10, 1943. 
Maurer assured the I.G. plant management that ―all the weak prisoners can be 
shunted out of the way,‖ so that ―almost full efficiency, in comparison with a 
German unskilled laborer, can be arrived at.‖155 The selections in the prisoner 
infirmary were directly linked to the number of workers sick and absent from 
work in the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp. As Dr. Friedrich Entress, an SS 
physician, stated: ―The number of patient blocks available in Monowitz propor-
tional to the occupancy of the entire Monowitz concentration camp meant in 
practical terms that no more than 5 percent of the prisoners could be admitted to 
the infirmary. Tables were kept to record the number of men out sick. Whenever 
that number exceeded the 5 percent mentioned, the camp doctor had to conduct 
selections.‖156 The average length of survival of the prisoners was three to four 
months in Monowitz.157 At the coal pits that were operated by the I.G. Farben 
affiliate Fürstengrube GmbH in the subcamps of Fürstengrube158 and Janina-
grube,159 the concentration camp inmates had to do slave labor under even more 
extreme conditions, and there they survived, on average, only four to six 
weeks.160 At Günthergrube alone, which also belonged to Fürstengrube GmbH, 
                                       
154  Rudolf Vitek, affidavit, March 3, 1947, NI-4830. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 61–69, here p. 67. 
155  I.G. Auschwitz, Wochenbericht Nr. 90/91 für die Zeit vom 8.2 bis 21.2.1943, gez. Faust, NI-
14546, p. 1. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger Dokumente, NI-
Serie. 
156  Friedrich Entress, affidavit, April 14, 1947, NI-6190. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 39–57, here p. 59. 
157  Cf. the statement of Berthold Epstein, who was deployed as a male nurse in the prisoner infir-
mary at Buna/Monowitz: Berthold Epstein, affidavit, March 3, 1947, NI-5847. Archiv des Fritz 
Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 193–197, here p. 195; 
also Rudolf Vitek, affidavit, March 3, 1947, NI-4830. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnber-
ger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 (g), pp. 61–69, here p. 66. 
158  Tadeusz Iwaszko: ―Das Nebenlager ‚Fürstengrube‗.‖ In: Hefte von Auschwitz 16 (1978), pp. 
5–92, and Andrea Rudorff: ―Fürstengrube.‖ In: Benz / Distel, eds.: Der Ort des Terrors, pp. 
221–225. 
159  Emeryka Iwaszko: ―Das Nebenlager ‚Janinagrube‗.‖ In: Hefte von Auschwitz 10 (1967), pp. 
41–65, and Andrea Rudorff: ―Janinagrube.‖ In: Benz / Distel, eds.: Der Ort des Terrors, pp. 
256–260. 
160  According to the prisoner-physician deployed at the Janinagrube concentration camp: Erich 
Orlik, affidavit, June 18, 1947, NI-12385. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, Nürnberger 
Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 75 N (g), pp. 18–24, here p. 20. 
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the mortality rate was somewhat lower, because the food supply and hygienic 
conditions were less abysmal.161 
The Camp Elders 
The first camp elder of Buna/Monowitz was Josef Windeck. He was born in 
Rheydt in 1903, the son of a construction worker.162 After school in Mönchen-
Gladbach, he worked in construction.163 After being sentenced several times for 
property crimes, he was accused in 1936 of having prompted his colleagues to 
stop work at the construction site. He served his time as a political prisoner in 
the Esterwegen-Papenburg concentration camp. Next, the SS transferred him to 
the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, from which he was released in the 
summer of 1937. In October 1937, he was once again convicted of property 
crimes and sentenced to two and one-half years in jail. After serving the sen-
tence, Windeck was moved to the Düsseldorf police prison and then sent back to 
Sachsenhausen. From there, on August 29, 1940, he was deported to Auschwitz, 
where he was given prisoner number 3221. Initially assigned as a Kapo with a 
black triangle (―asocial‖), he rose within a short time to the position of camp 
Kapo. From April 1941 to spring 1942, with interruptions caused by the weather, 
he was the Kapo of a work detachment involved in building I.G. Farben‘s Buna 
plant. On October 28, 1942, the SS moved him with 600 prisoners to 
Buna/Monowitz. Windeck was placed in Block 4, where the office was housed, 
and advanced to the position of camp elder. After accusations of corruption, the 
SS transferred him to a penal company in Birkenau, where he was given the po-
sition of camp Kapo in mens‘ camp BIId a few weeks later. In the late summer of 
1944, he was transferred to the Ohrdruf concentration camp, and finally, late in 
                                       
161  Tadeusz Iwaszko: ―Das Nebenlager ‚Günthergrube‗.‖ In: Hefte von Auschwitz 12 (1970), pp. 
113–144, and Andrea Rudorff: ―Günthergrube.‖ In: Benz / Distel, eds.: Der Ort des Terrors, 
pp. 243–247. 
162  The information about Windeck‘s life is based on trial documents from the Third Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trial: Strafsache gegen Grönke, Bonitz, Windeck – 4 Ks 1/67, LG Frankfurt am 
Main, Anklageschrift vom 20.8.1966. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-3, HA-2. See also 
Hermann Langbein: Der Auschwitz-Prozeß. Eine Dokumentation, 2 Vols. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Neue Kritik, 1995), p. 940, and Wagner: IG Auschwitz, p. 117f. 
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1944, he was sent to the Buchenwald concentration camp.164 In 1968, Windeck 
was sentenced by the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main ―for murder on two counts 
to life in prison, and for attempted murder on two counts, with credit for time in 
investigative custody and forced labor in Russia, to a total of 15 years in 
prison.‖165 In June 1969, Windeck was paroled for health-related reasons.166 He 
died in Mönchen-Gladbach in July 1977.167 After Windeck‘s dismissal, the function 
of camp elder in Buna/Monowitz was taken on temporarily by Franz Raschke, a 
native of Upper Silesia who was imprisoned as a ―professional criminal.‖ After a 
few weeks he was replaced by Hans Georg Scholle, who previously was assigned 
to the camp kitchen; he, too, was in the camp as a ―professional criminal.‖ From 
the end of 1943 until the camp was vacated in January 1945, Paul Kozwara 
functioned as his successor.168 
Escapes and Resistance 
In view of the daily destruction, the saving of human lives was one of the top 
priorities of the resistance movement. Other focal points of the illegal resistance 
activities were the political schooling of young prisoners and the procuring of 
foodstuffs, medicines, and various materials for improving the situation of the 
prisoners.169 At the I.G. Farben plant, prisoners attempted to exchange informa-
tion through forbidden contact with civilians, forced laborers, and prisoners of 
war. The resistance movement also succeeded in delaying the completion of the 
plant‘s construction by means of active sabotage in the work deployments. For 
example, a work squad of electricians caused a short circuit in the power sta-
                                       
164  Urteil im 3. Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess, June 14, 1968, LG Frankfurt am Main, 4 Ks 1/67. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-3, HA-3, p. 47f., and also in: Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. 
Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–
1999, Christiaan F. Rüter et al., eds., Vol. 29 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2003), pp. 420–
523, here p. 449. 
165  Urteil im 3. Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess, June 14, 1968, LG Frankfurt am Main, 4 Ks 1/67. 
Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-3, HA-3, p. 1a, and in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Vol. 29, 
pp. 420–523, here p. 423. 
166  Beschluss des LG Frankfurt/Main vom 12.6.1969, Strafsache gegen Grönke, Bonitz, Windeck – 
4 Ks 1/67. HHStAW, Abt. 461, no shelfmark (Vol. 108, pp. 20748–20749). 
167  Ibid., HHStAW, Abt. 461, no shelfmark (Vol. 108, p. 20775). 
168 Report on Auschwitz-Monowitz (Buna) by Curt Posener, undated. Archiwum Państwowe 
Muzeum Auschwitz-Birkenau, Zespół Oświadczenia, t. 6, Syg. Osw/Posener/14, pp. 824–882, 
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169  Ibid., p. 871. 
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tion‘s turbines during a trial run.170 According to the testimony of former inmate 
Walter Petzold, the prisoners‘ resistance movement thwarted the planned start-
up of a section of the plant for fuel synthesis on May 1, 1943, in celebration of 
the ―Day of National Labor.‖ Three days previously, on April 28, 1943, prisoners 
caused an explosion at the high-pressure plant. Simultaneously, ―a car shed with 
about 50 trucks and 20 tractors‖ burned down.171 At the top of the international 
network of resistance created in the camp, the leaders were mainly Poles, along 
with German and Austrian Jews. They held important functionary positions in the 
camp administration, working in the office (Gustav Herzog), labor service, or 
Arbeitsdienst (Walter Freiser), prisoner infirmary (Stefan Heymann, Leiser 
Sylmann, Felix Rausch, Eric Eisler, Nathan Hirschtritt, Erich Markowitz, Ludwig 
Wörl, and Sepp Luger) or in the external detachments (Louis Nissel, Walter 
Petzold, Erwin Taubert, Robert Wolff, Eduard Besch, Kasimir Stankiowitz, and 
Curt Posener).172 
In September 1944, two German Jewish prisoners, Max Drimmer and Mendel 
Scheingesicht (who adopted the name Herman Shine after the war), successfully 
escaped from the plant grounds. Józef Wróna, a Polish civilian worker with whom 
they had become acquainted at the I.G. Auschwitz plant construction site, helped 
them hide in Nowa Wieś (Neudorf) and then in Rybnik until the liberation.173 
Another successful escape was made in early August 1944 by a group of five 
Polish prisoners from the Buna/Monowitz concentration camp: Tadeusz 
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2002), p. 57. 
171  Walter Petzold, examination by public prosecutor, Berlin, February 10, 1960, LG Frankfurt am 
Main, 4 Ks 2/63. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, FAP-1, HA-25, pp. 4201–4211, here p. 4302. 
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Petrykowski, Józef Toporek, Franciszek Petersil, Antoni Lao, and Władisław 
Tomasiak. First they concealed themselves for three days in a hiding place 
prepared by the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) on the plant grounds of I.G. 
Auschwitz. Then, during an air-raid alarm, they used prepositioned ladders to get 
over the plant‘s fence and succeeded in joining a partisan unit of the Armia 
Krajowa that was operating in southern Poland.174 
After attempted escapes, all the prisoners in the camp had to stand in their roll-
call positions for hours on end, as a punishment.175 If escaped prisoners were 
caught, they were hanged before the eyes of their fellow inmates. Several pris-
oners testified to the last execution at the camp: that of the three prisoners Leo 
Diament, Janek Grossfeld, and Nathan Weissmann.176 
Air Attacks on Auschwitz 
The first air strike on the I.G. Farben plant in Auschwitz carried out by Allied 
forces and involving several aircraft took place during the night of May 4 and 
early morning of May 5, 1943. According to a report from the head of 
Amtsgruppe A (Troop Administration) of the WVHA, SS-Gruppenführer August 
Frank, to Himmler on May 13, 1943, the Monowitz camp was ―attacked by enemy 
aircraft‖ and hit by nine bombs in the vicinity of the prisoners‘ camp, but without 
suffering any damage. An airplane had attacked the watchtowers, he stated, and 
―fired machine-gun rounds at them.‖ As a result, the camp commandant was in-
structed to call for ―appropriate defense, consisting of one dozen 2-cm antiaircraft 
guns, provided by the Luftgaukommando [air defense district command] in 
charge.‖177 
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As Auschwitz was not within the range of the Western Allies‘ air forces until De-
cember 1943, it is still not known with certainty to which air force formation the 
aircraft involved in the May 1943 attack belonged. It could have been a strike 
carried out by the air forces of the Red Army.178 The radius of action of American 
and British bomber formations was determined by the range of their fighter es-
corts, which could not yet reach Auschwitz. After the landing of Allied troops in 
southern Italy and the capture of the Italian military airfield at Foggia in Decem-
ber 1943, the use of Mustang fighter planes became possible for the first time. 
That extended the radius of action of the U.S. Army Air Force from 650 to 1,400 
kilometers (from 403 to 870 miles), which meant that targets in Hungary, Ro-
mania, Slovakia, southern Poland, and Upper Silesia were within range.179 In 
preparation for strategic air strikes on industrial facilities of high significance to 
German war production, the I.G. Farben plant in Auschwitz was photographed for 
the first time on April 4, 1944, during an American aerial reconnaissance mis-
sion. When interpreting the aerial photographs, Royal Air Force specialists based 
in Medmenham identified ―a power plant, a carbide factory, a factory for syn-
thetic rubber, and a (Bergius process) plant for the production of synthetic 
oil.‖180 
Additional reconnaissance flights followed between May 31 and mid-August 
1944.181 On July 18, the I.G. Farben plant was defined as a target for the first 
time.182 With this prerequisite in place, the 15th U.S. Army Air Force flew the first 
major bombing raid on the factory buildings of I.G. Auschwitz on August 20, 
1944. Thanks to the heavy escort of 100 Mustang fighters, only one of the 127 
                                       
178  The American historian Joseph Robert White assumes that it most likely was a strike carried 
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bombers participating was shot down. The strike inflicted considerable damage 
on the production facilities of I.G. Auschwitz.183 During the air strike, the Mono-
witz prisoner Adam Szaller was able to escape.184 According to the testimony of 
another Monowitz prisoner, Siegfried Pinkus, before the Nuremberg Military Tri-
bunal, ―around 75 prisoners [were] killed and more than 150 prisoners injured, 
some slightly, others seriously,‖ in this attack. Pinkus attributed a share of the 
responsibility for this to the I.G. Auschwitz plant management, because it had 
forbidden prisoners to take cover in shelters they themselves had fashioned.185 
Though they were in mortal danger, many prisoners welcomed the Allied air at-
tacks because they terrified the SS guard details, reduced the capacities of Ger-
man war production, and brought the longed-for liberation closer.186 Though one 
of the bombing raids rendered the concentration camp‘s kitchen inoperable, as it 
used a district heating system, the I.G. Auschwitz plant management refused to 
provide the prisoners with food from the plant‘s kitchen as an alternative.187 
Martin Rossbach, an I.G. Auschwitz company officer with statutory authority, 
said after the war that the plant management had sounded the air-raid alarm at 
Auschwitz too late and ―only when there was a truly immediate threat to the 
plant,‖ in an effort to minimize production losses.188 The construction of air-raid 
shelters, which did not begin until 1943, was completely inadequate. Until De-
cember 1944, air-raid shelter facilities were available for only 7,800 of the ap-
proximately 29,000 workers at the plant construction site.189 The plant 
management forbade prisoners, under threat of a shoot-to-kill order, to take 
cover in air-raid shelters.190 
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August 29, 1947, NI-10820, p. 3. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger 
Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
186  On this subject, see the statements of former prisoners Arie Hassenberg and Shalom 
Lindenbaum in: Gilbert: Auschwitz, p. 361, p. 370, and p. 435, fn. 10. 
187  Interrogation No. 743. – Vernehmung des Dr. Walther Dürrfeld durch Mr. von Halle, am 
24.2.1947, NI-11046, p. 27f. Archiv der Stiftung für Sozialgeschichte Bremen, Nürnberger 
Dokumente, NI-Serie. 
188  Martin Rossbach, affidavit, January 21, 1948, NI-14287. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 93 (g), pp. 34–50, here p. 47. 
189  White: ―Target Auschwitz,‖ p. 57. 
190  Martin Rossbach, affidavit, January 21, 1948, NI-14287. Archiv des Fritz Bauer Instituts, 
Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozess Fall VI, PDB 93 (g), pp. 34–50, here p. 40. 
www.wollheim-memorial.de Florian Schmaltz: The Buna/Monowitz Concentration Camp, p. 41 
  
 
Additional air attacks followed in the fall of 1944. On September 13, 1944, the 
airstrikes of a U.S. Army Air Force bombardment group consisting of 96 Liberator 
bombers severely damaged I.G. Farben‘s Auschwitz plant. The main camp, too, 
and the Auschwitz II camp in Birkenau were hit. In this air raid, an estimated 
300 persons, including SS men, were injured or killed.191 A further airstrike on 
December 18, 1944, did heavy damage to the pumping and compressor plants of 
I.G. Auschwitz. As an Allied analysis report mentions, five barracks of the con-
centration camp also were damaged in the bombing raid.192 The fourth air attack 
on the I.G. Farben plant in Auschwitz, which occurred on December 26, 1944, 
was evaluated as a success by Allied aerial reconnaissance on the basis of the 
severe damage suffered by the plant.193 The last raid carried out by the U.S. 
Army Air Force took place on January 19, 1945, one day after the evacuation of 
the camp complex began, when the SS forced the prisoners to head westward on 
the death march.194 In the United States and Great Britain, since the late 1970s 
there has been controversy regarding the reasons for the Allied air forces‘ failure 
to use bombing raids to destroy the extermination facilities or the access tracks 
on which the deportation trains rolled toward Auschwitz, in order to slow the 
pace of the mass murder.195 
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The Evacuation of the Camp 
On January 18, 1945, the SS gave the order to vacate the Auschwitz-III-Mono-
witz concentration camp complex, which included the Buna/Monowitz concentra-
tion camp and the subcamps. Approximately 800 to 850 sick prisoners, who were 
too weakened to take part in the death march, stayed behind in the 
Buna/Monowitz concentration camp.196 Around 10,000 were forced to set out on 
the death march,197 which subsequently claimed the lives of many. Thousands 
died of exhaustion, froze to death in the icy cold, starved to death on the march, 
and were beaten to death or shot by the SS because they could go no farther.198 
The death march took them via Mikołów to Gleiwitz (Gliwice), where the prison-
ers who were still alive were loaded onto open freight cars and transported to 
concentration camps located farther west. Many went to the Mittelbau-Dora con-
centration camp, where they were exploited for several more harrowing months 
as slave laborers in the arms industry, until their liberation. The prisoners who 
stayed behind at Auschwitz were liberated by Red Army troops of the 60th Army 
of the First Ukrainian Front on January 27, 1945.199 
 
(Translated from German by Kathleen Luft) 
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